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2/2/72
Rea
I.

Texas State Legislative Redistricting Case--Graves v. Barnes
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
This application for a stay pending appeal is from the judg-

ment of a three-judge court sitting in the USDC WD Texas (GOldberg,
Justice, Woods--Per Curiam).

The action below grows out of four

consolidated actions filed in four district courts.

The four

cases raised the following issuesa
(1) Graves--challenge to apportionment plan for the Senatorial
Districts in Harris County (Houston) on the ground that they
were racially gerrymandered.
(2) Regester--challenge to the House of Representative reapportionment plan for the Texas House on the ground of populational disparities.

They also challenged the use of multi-member

districts in the metropolitan communities as invidious discrimination.
(3) Marriott--challenged the House reapportionment plan's
provisions dealing with multi-member districts (Dallas
__,.. plaintiffs)
(4) Archer--challenge to the House Plan on the ground that
multi-member districts violate equal protection (San Antonio-Bexar County).

Also challenged the Senate Plan on ground of

racial gerrymandering.
The four cases were consolidated and a single three-judge
panel appointed by Judge Brown.

A pretrial conference was held on

12/22/71 and an expedited discovery and trial procedure was agreed
on.

The Plans under attack--both House and Senate--were promul-

gated by the ~exas Legislative Redistricting Bd, a bod~reated by
the Texas Constitution to resolve all redistricting problems if
the Texas Legislature is unable to redistrict in its , first session
after the decennial census.
15th and 22d of October.

The Plans were handed down on the

--2 .. II.

HOLDINGS OF THE

THREE~Judge

COURT

(1)

R~tricting

Plan promulgated by the Board was

The Senate
- - -...

A

-

approved by the court and is not now before you in this stay
application.
(2)

-

The House Redistricting Plan was held violative of the

equal protection clause because of populational deviations.

The

court found, using the most conservative statistical measuring
rod offered by the State, that there existed populational deviation
of 9.9 . %.

The comrt noted that the burden is on the State to

justify deviations from t methematical equality, i.e., that it was
the State's burden to demonstrate a rational justification for
populational disparities.

The court held that the State had

offered no evidence to meet that burden.
offered was adherence to county lines.

The only justification
The court noted, on that

score, that (1) the plan itself crossed county lines in 19

in~

stances, and (2) decisions of the Supreme Court have held that
blind adherence to political lines will not justify such wide
disparities.

Despite its concluion that the House Plan was uncon.s-fared
stitutional, the three-judge court
that it was unwilling
to ursurp the prerogative of the Texas House of Representatives

until it becomes clear that the State is unwilling to correct it 0 s
deficiencies.

Therefore, the court stayed its own decision for

purposes of the upcoming election.
go into operation for this election.

The Board 9 s deficient plan will
But, between the convening

of the 1973 Session and July 1 of that year the Texas house is
ordens to write another plan.

If the State House refuses to act 1

then the DC, which is retaining jurisidiction,
then enter a plan of its own.

~nkr

will

At this point in time, then, there

is no air of immediacy about that aspect of the case.

This Court

will have ample opportunity to pass on the merits of this segment of

--3 ...

case before any irreparable injury may occur.

The State virtually

concedes that the stay is not being sought to abate the court's
decision on this aspect of the case (P. 19 of Stay application).
(3)

The court held the 18-man multi-member disftrict in

Dallas County ........ unconstitutional.
the

imp~mentation

of single-member

according to its own plan.

The court ordered

dis~tricts

for Dallas

The court's plan will be in effect

for this upcoming election,but the State's Redistricting Plan which
the court orden.fby July 1, 1973 may impose different requirements.
As an "equity of transition" the court ruled that the candidate
need not reside in the district from which he runs in this
next election.

The provision of the Texas Constitution re-

quiring residence in the district is abated for this year--the
candidate may live IfilL anywhere in the county.
(4)

The court held that the 11-man multi-member district

in San Antonio (Bexar County) violated the constitution • • The ct
here also imposed its own plan for the 1972 elections and abated the
residency rule.
(5)

The court refused to hold that the other 9 multi-member

districted metropolitan communities in the State violated the
Constitution.

That aspect of the case is not before you in

this application.

III.

DISCUSSION
As CEP and I read this application, the only two issues

before you on this request for stay are whether the Dallas and
Bexar County multi-member districts are Constitutionally unacceptable.

The law on this question seems clear (although its impli-

mentation presents difficult factual problems).

-'IMulti-member districts are not per se unconstitutional.

In

Whitcomb v. Chavis the Court makes clear that the 14th Amendment
does not imply that "any group with distinctive interests must be
represented in the legislative halls if it is numerous enough
to command at least one seat."
notes,

No group, as the three-judge

~s

any constitutional right to be successful in its porlte
litical activities." However, ~ State "may not design a SJ!Stem

that deprives such groups of a reasonable chance to be successful."
(P. 56 of DC opinion).

On several occasions this Court has

made clear that
apportionment schemes including multi-member districts
will constitute invidious discrimination only if it can be
shown that 'desi&nedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a
particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population."

-

Burns v. Richardson, 384

u.s.

73, 88 (1966).

See also

Fortson v.

Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,438-39 (1965); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124, 143 (1971).

Finally, Whitcomb made clear that the ~n

~

~

rests on the challenger to demonstrate that the multi-member dis- ~~
trict unconstitutionally operates to dilute or cancel the voting
strength of racial or political elements. Id. at 144.

It is un-

contested that the DC was fully aware of the applicable law.
Indeed, as to both Dallas and Bexar Counties, the DC did conclude
that multi-member districts tended to dilute or cancel out the
vote of Negro or Mexican-American elements. (Pp. 42, SS-56).
The controlling inquiry is whether the facts found by the DC
supported that judgment.
(1) Dallas County
To place the question in context, the DC noted that the multimember district plan cannot be justified as State dedication to

-S·

.

the neutral principle that such districts
are to be preferred in
' .
all metropolitan communities,

...._

Houston, the largest community,

\~
,_.,, .... ..
~

does not have multi-member districts but has 23 single-member

~

districts (Harris County).

~

As the DC noted, the disparity be-

tween Houston and all other metropolitan areas--a disparity which

I~

the State made no effort to explain--leads to the inference
that the plan is either arbitrary for no reason or is affirmatively discriminatory for some impermissible

mot~ve.

Secondly,

as a preface applicable to both counties in question in this case,
the DC indicated that it is more expensive to run from a large
multi-member district than it is to run in a geographically smaller

--- -

---------------------community for a single district
slot. This cost increase
......

makes it more difficult for poorer classes to be represented.
This is an impact of multi-member districts which adheres in all
such districts but is one upon which this Court does not appear to
have

()7'1...
focuse~in

any of its major reapportionment cases.

Turning to the factors which the DC found controlling in
Dallas, the following aspects of the Dallas Plan were relied

~ ~~ ~~

upona
(1) Most

o~las's

"!

16% Black population votes Democratic.

The........,Party slate is drawn up by the Dallas Committee for Responsi'

and Negroes have no voice on that Committee. The
they are
Committee tells the Blacks how many slots ii i4 allowed on the ballot.
ble ~ Gyvernment

In the 20th Century only 4 Negroes have been placed on the ballot.
(2) The Dallas County delegation to the State House of Representatives has consistently
constituents,
the 1950s.

failed to represent their Black

Dalles Legislators led the fight for segregation in

As recently as 1970, the DCRG was utilizing racial

campaign tactics to win races in white precincts.
(3)

Hostility toward Blacks has been in the past, and is today,

-~ "an integral part of Dallas County

poli~ics."

This is to be

distinguished from Marion County (Indianapolis) in the Whitcomb
case in which the Court

found~ race played no significant role

in party politics.
(4)

Within the multi-member district Texas uses a mechan-

ism known as the "place requirement."

-

Under this rule each

candidate must choose a place on the ballot.

It makes no difference

which area of the county is his homeaindeed, as the court statede
all the candidates could conceivably live in the same apartment
house.

Because of this rule it is quite possible--and the usual

________________________________,______________

occurrence--that none of the Party's candidates is from the

--

Black segment of town.
(5)

..,

Another aspect of the multi-member district plan is the

"majority" requirement.

Under this requirement, which the DC

pointed out was a tool utilized only in Southern States, each
successful candidate must garner a majority of the vote.

-Under

--------~--------------------------------------------------the
Texas scheme, therefore, the eighteen candidates receiving
the most votes are not necessarily the representatives.
must poll a majority of the vote.

Run-off elections will be held

for all places in which a majority was . not obtained.
found that these two

-I-ke

Each

pl~e reuire..,errr

dvJ. ik majori~

requirements,~working

The DC
r't!ffire rtterrf-j

together operate to

"submerge racial or political minorities."

(2) Bexar County (San Antonio)
The

p ~ em

Dallas case.
the

in San Antonio is somewhat different from the

Here the recognizable element of the electorate is

Mexican~American

population and, although no statistics are

cited, they clearly represent a significant percentage of the
population (around 50%).

a.. nalyo~

The DC launches its 1L

a · ~with

an extended discussion indicating that Mexican: American 8 s do

constitute a recognizable ethnic group

.......
~ntit
led
.
\,.;

equal protection guarantees available to Negroes.

to the same
It then

indicates that these Mexican-Americans or "Chicanos" live
predomintly in the "barrio" or West Side of San Antonio within a
small and relatively contiguous area.

The court points out the

"appalling" conditions of poverty under which they live and
v i.s/lole

that they exist in a defimable and e· 2 r•e subculture with
own
its severe cultural and language barriers,
epaJ.al-tn(J Me haJ.-r JO
A
fre~h} r~t!.. r~n?u/nder A .r~ #n,t!t:7.Hi'o,
(!) ; ·Looking again at the difficulties of campaigning costs, the
DC found that Anglo candidates spend 2

o~

3 times as much as

Chicano candidates.
(2)

Only 4 candidates have run from the barrio since 1880 for

the Texas House of Representatives.

Only 5 Chicanos from Bexar

County have served in the Texas Legislature since 1880.
(3) Voter registration is very low in San Antonio among MexicanAmericans.

Only about 30% of all of that group register.

The

DC finds that the multi-member district pattern operates to keep
the Mexicans from realizing their participatory role in the
government.
(4) Of course, Bexar County has the same majority-place requirements
which operate in Dallas.

CONCLUSION
First, despite the other disagreements among the panel mambers,
and despite Judge Woods' disagreement with the philosophy of
federal judicial activity in the reapportionment area, all three
concur in the finding that Bexar and Dallas Counties may not
retain multi-member districts.
because they

They reach this conclusion precisely

fltGre.- pcJJ..fic.vl a J- c.l tsff.~e.f.s
agree tha~ 't:!ilay "operate to

l
\

dilute or cancel the

voting strength of racial or political elements."

\
\

---8-Second, the DC's order is drawn narrowly(as the Court in

~£itcomb_ intimates

that it should

b~.

403 U.S. at 160-61.

The

DC looked at the individual districts and found that these two
met the standards of proof called for by Whitcomb.

It did not

strike down multi-member districts in 9 other metropolitan areas

of~~-------------------------Texas. This restrictiveness in the court's decision is the
best indicator that the court did not really conclude that
multi-member districts are presumptively invalid.

Third, the State urges that it will be difficult, expensive,
and maybe even impossible for the two counties in question to redo their voter registration statistics before the upcoming primaries.

The State is apparently concerned about telling citizens

in which precinct they are to vote.

However, the State nowhere

tells us in how many cases the court's lines cross precinct lines.
There are 299 precincts in Dallas, which
districts.
been

h ~t lfG
~

been

There are about 225 precincts in San Antonio,
4Aflrn!J

divided~

11 districts.

tUnUIII tJ

divided~

18

,

wh~ch

h ~t V<!.

._.

Without other information 1 it is

my guess that relatively few of the precincts will be severed by
the district lines.
single district.

Most will probably be entirely within a

Indeed, I am not persuaded that the counties will

necessarily need to alter precinct lines for this election.

Resi-

dents in precincts which straddle district lines could still vote
at the same polling place but would be instrlcted to vote for
different candidates.

.

I assume all this information could be

dtssiminated through the newspapers

or through one mass mailing

to all registered voters.
I would deny the stay.

The question is a narrow one--whether

the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that the multi-member
districts in two counties operated to dilute or cancel the voting
strength of racial or political elements.

The DC, as I read its

_,_
opinion 9 correctly appraised the status . of Supreme Court law.
I find the elements of proof relied on by the DC to be sufficient.
I wonder what the plaintiffs could have done to make a stronger
case.

a. c. c. e~ t- ra.c::.1
reluctanc~

·r o

Dallas is notoriously well-known for its

over the last 20 years.

r~~~~

1

The history of San Antonio is, in some

respects, more disappointing.

The "minority" there is larger

yet its needs have been largely ignored for many, too,nmany1 years.
Neither the Blacks nor the Chicanos have ever actively participated
in Texas political life.

Multi-member district abolition is

certainly not the universal salve that will end
of political impotence.
place requirement, and

That

ruit

,.,~J,IVH;Jo }?4
~sng

~

''-

long
history
,.,.,

sm--coupled with the majority-

by a powerful

has contributed to subjugation.

fht"s

~emocratic

machine--

On the other side of the scale,
Cll

where we would suspect to find a catelogue of unique state interests
justifying the continued utilization of multi-member districts,
there is nothing.

The State has chosen to offer no explanation.

In light of the status of Houston it is not surprising that the
State has failed to lay before the court its reasons for
multi-member districts.
For mep the question is not a difficult one.

I recommend that

you reject the application for stay pending appeal.
LAH

a./

~ -

-

7
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Curtis Graves et al.

v.
Ben Barnes et al.
Diana Regester et al.

v.
Bob Bullock ot al.
Johnny :\Iariott et al.

v.

Application for a Stay of a Judgment of a Three-Judge District Court for the \V estern
District of Texas.

Preston Smith et al.
Van Henry Archer, Jr ..

v.
Pre ton Smith et al.
[F0bruary 7, 19721
:VIH. JrSTICE PowELL. Circuit Justice.
This is an application for a i"tay of the judgment of a
thrce-j uclge court sitting in tho Western District of Texas.
The court's decision covers issues raised in four consoli-·
elated actions. Tho principal issues were as follows:
1. In Graves Y. Barnes, plaintiffs challenged tho State's
reapportionment plan for the senatorial districts in Harris
County (Houston) on the ground that they were racially
gerryma nclerPcl.
2. In Regester Y. Bullock, the State's reapportionment
plan for the Texas House of Hepresentativcs "·as challenged 011 the grounds of population deviatio11S from
the one-man, one-vote requirement, aml on the impermissibility of use of multi-member districts in the nwtro-·
politan communities.

2
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3. In Mariott v. Smith, the House plan provision calling for a multi-member district for Dallas County was
challenged.
4. 1n Archer Y. Smith, a generally similar attack was
lcvelkcl against the usc of multi-member clistricting in
Bexar County (San Antonio).
The four rases \\We consolidated and tried by a single
thrC'e-judgc panel. After full pretrial discovery, during
whirh. over 2,000 pages of depositions "·ere taken, the
District Court heard testimony at a three-and-one-half
clay hearing. The extensive per curiam opinon, and the
concurring and dissenting opinions, "·hich were handed
dom1 after some three weeks of deliberation, reflect a
careful and exhaustive consideration of the issues in light
of the facts as developed. The court's conclusions, in
substance, \rcrc as follmrs:
(a) The Senate redistricting plan, as promulgated by
the Texas Legislative Redistricting Board. was approved.
(b) The House redistricting plan was held violative
of the Equal Protection Clause because of population deviations from equality of representation. But, in an
exercise of judicial restraint, the court suspended its
decision in this respect for the purpose of affording thc
Legislature of Texas a11 opportunity to adopt a new and
constitutional plan. Meanwhile, the forthcoming election may be held under the plan found to be deficient.
(c) The multi-nH'mber district plans for Dallas and
Bexar Counties were found to be unconstitutional under
the standard prescribed by this Court in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 r. S. 433, 438-39 (1965); Rurns Y. Richardson,
384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966); and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124, 143 (1971). The three-judge court found from
the evidence that these multi-member district plans \rould
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of
racitll minority elements of the voting population, and
ordered the implementation of a plan calling for singlem.ember districts for Dallas and Bexar Counties. The·
State offered no plan for single-member districts for these

9.1~~
(1/-rz.,~~

;& I<{)

GR .\YES v. H.\H{{ES
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counties, and the court was compelled to draft its own
plan. To minimize tho disruptive impact of its ruling.
tho court ordered that the State's requirement that candidates run from the district of their residence be abated
for the forthcoming election. A candidate residing anywhere within tho county, therefore, may run for election
from any district in the county.
(d) The evidence with respect to nino other metropolitan multi-member districts was found insufficient to
warrant treatment sin1ilar to that required for Dallas and
Bexar Counties.
(c) Finally, the court's order stated that its judgment
"·as final and that no stays would be granted.
In view of the foregoing holdings, the only present
necessity to consider a stay relates to the District Court's.
decision with respect to multi-member districts in Dallas
and Bexar Counties. A number of principles have been
recognized to govern a Circuit Justice's in-chambers review of stay applications. Stays pending ap11eal to this
Court are granted only in extraordinary circumstances.
A lower court judgment, entered by a tribunal that was
closer to the facts than the single Justice, is entitled to a
presumption of validity. Any party seeking a stay of
that judgment bears the burden of showing that tho decision below was erroneous and that the implementation
of the judgment pending appeal "·ill lead to irreparable
harm.
As a threshold consideration, Justices of this Court
have consistently required there be a reasonable probability that four Members of tho Court will consider the
issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari or to note
probable jurisdiction. See Mahon v. Howell, 404 U. S.
1201, 1202 (1971); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,
80S. Ct. 33, 4 L. eel. 2d 34 (1959). Of equal importance
in cases presented on direct appeal-where we lack the
discretionary power to refuse to decide tho merits-is the
related question whether five Justices are likely to conclude that the case was erroneously decided below. Jus-

'

4
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tices have also 'wiglwcl heavily the fact that the lo,Yer·
court refused to stay its order pending appeal. indicating
that it was not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of
potentially irreparable harm as a result of enforcement
of its judgment in the interim.
In applying these considerations to the present case ..
I conclude that a stay should not be granted. The case·
received careful attention by the three-judge court, the
members of which were "on the sce11e" and more familiar
with the situation than the Justices of this Court; and
the opinions attest to a conscientious application of
principles enunciated by this Court. Moreover, the order·
of the court was narrowly dram1 to effectuate its decision
with a minimum of interference with the State's legislative processes, and with a minimum of administrative·
confusion in the short run.
Following a practice utilized by other Justices in passing on applications raising serious constitutional questions (see Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10, 9 L. ed. 2d 43·
(1962); M cGee v. Eyman , 83 S. Ct. 230, 9 L. eel. 2d 267
(1963)), I have consulted informally with each of my
Brethren "·ho was availablelf at this time during the recess. Although no other Justice has participated in the ·
drafting of this opinion , I am authorized to say that each
of them would vote to deny this application . My denial
of a stay at this point, of course, may not be taken
either as a statement of my own position on the merits
of the difficult questions raised in this case, or as an indication of what may, in fact, ultimately be the view of my
Colleagues on the Court.
The application is denied.

·::·All Justices, save two who were not antilable, luwc been consulted .

This is an appeal by the State of Texas from the
ment of a

three~judge

scheme for the
tutional.

S~ ate

judg~

ct declaring Texas' reapportionment
House of Representatives unconsti·

You are familiar with the facts of this case.

You denied a stay sought by the State last winter.

(Attached

you will find the lengthy memo I wrote· at that time and a
copy of your In Chambers opinion).
The appeal presents three merits issues and one
dictional issue.

juris~

In view of my more extensive treatment in

the attached memo, I will treat the merits claims in
conclusory fashion.
(1)
The

Populational disparity
three~judge

ct found that the state had failed to

*~i% a~;:;;:_;t~ ~ ~v~l.£:~
I"}--&.. C1-',... ~
-

exact populational equality.

Rather than enjoin the

effectiveness of the State's Plan, however , the ct stayed
the effectiveness of its decision until the summer of 1973.
Therefore, the elections this fall will go forward under the \
state 0 s plan and the State will have an

opportuni~

to

correct it 8 s plan later .
The State in its jurisdictional statement heavily
emphasizes this aspect of the case--indeed it is the major

~~ argues that

focus of his claim for this Ct's intervention.

the 9.9% disparity was an effort to assure respect for the

II

integrity of

--

count~

lines.

With the exception of metro-

politan areas, the State asserts that the drafters of the
Plan only crossed QUQ county line.

Appellees assert that

the Plan crossed 19 county lines and that is the number
adopted by the DC.

The State at bottom argues that the

course of SC law in this area should change.

It seeks a

ruling that 10 to 20% (or more) disparity should be
presumptively valid where state reapportionment is con-

-

cerned.

That is one of the claims before the Ct now in the

V irginia state reapportionment case.

The Ct may decide

there whether it is prepared to adopt a double standard for
the states and whether it is willing to s e t some figure
as the presumptively rational minimum of departure from

I~ I --

equality.

The instant appeal should , therefore , be held

pending resolution of that question.

~---------------------------(2) Multi-member districts

in San Antonio

Surprisingly, although the State AG preserves this
issue , he only devotes a page of his brief to it.

-

He still

a rgues that multi-member districts should be upheld but he

,..-3-~

does so without the zeal we saw last winter 9

It is my

guess that your in Chambers opinion took the wind out of
that argument.

It is pretty clear that the

three~judge

ct

appropriately applied existing precedent (Whitcomb, Burns,
Fortson) and that its factual determinations of intentional
subjugation of racially identifiable minorities is support"
able.

Your conferences with other Justices while the sttay

was under submission last year would seem to guarantee that
the Ct will not find this matter noteworthy.
(3)

Multi-member districts in Dallas

See id. The factual support for the Dallas findings are
even more persausive than the San Antonio determination.
(4)

Jurisdictional question

Appellees argue that this Ct does not have jurisdiction.
Section 1253, which governs appeals directly to this Ct
from three- judge cts, states tha·t a direct appeal is proper
from any judgment granting or denying injunctive relief.
As to the issue of statewide populational disparity the
)

lower ct did not grant or deny injunctive relief.

Appellees

therefore assert that the only recourse is appeal to the
CAS.

Or, if the Ct were to view the decision to stay the

effectiveness of the

d#~tiH!d~

judgment as a denial of an

injunction, the State should not be allowed to appeal on
that basis because it is not injured by the denial of the
injunction.

To the contrary, it was benefited by the denial

of the injunction.
As to the multi-member district issue, appellees
believe that no direct appeal is available because the

iHi#I.i# did not issue an order striking down a law of "statewide"

applicability.

Here the appellees are arguing that the DC did

not have jurisdiction to issue such a narrow order and,
therefore, this Ct does not have jurisdiction to review.
My inclination is, as it was last February, that neither
argument is well taken.
(1)

The latter fails for two reasons.

This Ct has encouraged reapportionment cts to issue

narrow orders, granting injunctive relief only in egregious
cases where time is not available for the state to correct
its own system.

That is precisely what this DC did.

I

cannot believe that this Ct will now hold that the DC, while
it had power to consider the whole state, was without power
to strike down only a narrow portion of the plan.

,

~ th~ " ~ide applicability~ r~le
~

r : fers

I thina

t~~:_law

or regul•

\ at~on under attack at the outset and has nothing to do with
the scope of the remedy issued by the DC in the exercise of
its broad equitable powers.

(2)

Appellees canQt seriously

be arguing that the DC did not have jurisdiction.

If so,

what prewents the State from asserting in this Ct that the
DC judgment should be reversed for lack of jurisdiction?
The argument isp in my view, hypertechnical and unpersaasive.
And, if the Ct has jurisdiction to review the multimember district claims it may, as a pendent matter, review
the populational disparity issue.

Even if the Ct wishes only

to review the population issue, I think that the failuve of
the DC to enter or deny an injunction could be disregarded.
Of coursep if the Ct decides for some reason to note the
case it should postpone jurisdictional considerations until
hearing on the merits but I find them not too bothersome.
HOLD FOR VRIGINIA REAPPORTIONMENT CASE

LAH

·

No. 72-147 BUl..l..OCK v. REGESTER
~
7~~~

/,a.,_

Argued 2/24/73

4> ~

CM•.rl;<_.,-- ~

<:J. ~ /. 7 2.. ~ ) ~ ' ~ J-4.,..,A • ~
l.A... ~~ ,t J.~ , .... 4-& ••• J., . . ~~~

t>( 9. 9 ?o
~

&Ao1o...

'

a.

2., cz,_.to ~4'-~··~4~~ ~ ~
'~-- sf~ J ?- f~L. ;;:;- .el(..~~-u..4t- ~ ~.-.""" ~
~

........ ..,...., ......

...6-.-......:...., .

~~~~~.

~-4~(;1. A.

""

~ tzt....,~

.

J-~~

1~~'-L--~-~~

~~ .
3

~.

Jjc:_+

~ ~ ~ ~ ~t::.--.

/.1--~ 9-~. ~ .

To-1-tz-L ~. ~ er,Cf' ~o

~ ~~ l.?"~c!Jo

~/il ~ ~""- ~~ ~
'h,

~~~-n· s

a,~~

~~~

~~~~1~~
~~~
6(:::;lbQ.=

72vJC:I - ~. q~~

~~ ~.) c¥ ~ ~

~
~ '

.

.

~a - ~~

~~~ '--~~~~
(,-e.-v- ''.

~(~
~

d.....L.L

I

.ro ....... a.~ ... ..,_ oj

L._

I~.

~~v~~~(~~)

-;

~Cv~~~,,

~(~~--~ ~~~~)
(l.,.g~

~~~ ~

ct-

sf~~{~)

~~~tv'-~~~.

~~~a-rv~~

~~·
•

~(fy~J

4)~~~~~ ~~~ i/lv.--~.

~ ~{lc/-vu.~_i-~·) . . ~f.v~-- ~

~-~~.~1¥~
-,;
~~~~~~~~~~
~

C-~~. ~~· ~1

~o-r~~~~.)~~

~~~s-f 19-<J
~~

0<>-0

"'-'"

~ ~
6._,

~(~-)
~~~~~~· ~

c(..- ·~

~~~ ~s-;~~j - ~
~ ~ ~ Ly ~I 7A.-o -e.v-.
k:,

'

rt-~

.

~~-

~~~ ~~ ~
..

~ ;_~~~(..e_#t· ~~/

P~)~)~~~~~~
~~~~ -

1~..:!'~)

' ·~ LJo-cr-J-(~)~

~

t)

~~a..··

e.-<-<-., ..

.
l.<A..;

.

s-;~ .

~ ~ ~~~~L

~v:~'/z - 1~7
~. ~~7~7
~

16. .

cr

~ /~..r<.... .

~

p~~(
L-._,.__

,

v~

~~~~~~~~

~{~h)
T~ ~
1,

~

.-"2.<-{)

~~

~ L~

tot.f'o ~

~
2,

77uz_

~~ ~ ~~- ht

o-f~~

t

~~ ~ v~ ~03 1-L S.
1 -

6C...-

~

C!-t/u-~ ~~

4, L9

~~

(J

+

- +

~

/2 rt9'§£f/r'-

~rl..<~~.

t-

I
1·

jt-f2.t!JA..A./

f-.c>
-

~

~ ~ ~ ~

.

i--t-

r-~~c~LO
~ I

J_,c (JJ-z_
_,_..,.j.._~_).._A- "'--<--

~
~ ~~<'"\ ~ ~(........,_a.-f-1<-t-~
a-.

Uu_

-

-

LAH 3/1/73
Re:

REAPPORTIONMENT CASES

Judge:
The following is an effort to outline in skeletal
form the issues and critical facts in these three cases
in order to suggest a manner of disposition which I believe
is compatible with your vilews as I understand them.

(1)

Bullock v. Weiser, No. 71-1623
This is the Texas Congressional reapportionment case.

Populational disparity from the "ideal" of 4.1%.

There

are at least three alternatives that might be selected
upon which the reverse the DC 9 s determination that the Texas
plan is unconstidtutional.
(1)

Overrule Kirkpatrick v. Priesler.

Chalrles Black makes a strong argument for this proposi"
tion. His primary points are (1) that the historical foundaft
tion of Article I

9

§

2 shows a desire to achieve approximate

equality (as suggested in Wesberry v. Sanders) but no serious
effort to achieve any mathematical parity; (2) populational
statistics, based on census figures, are too loosely related
to voter statistics and, therefore 9 provide no accurate
measure of the existence of

disproportiona~lity;

(3) the

rule is productive of "great harm" because it occasions
considerable judicial intervention in state legislative
activities.
Considerations on the other side 9 however 9 suggest
that an alternative to overruling Kirkpatrick should be
sought.

(1)

It is a recent precedent and its abrogation

would surely be viewed as a consequence of a changed

. . . z- . .
personnel on the Court.

(2)

In light of the fact that it

is cited extensively in Mahin v. Howell (9 times by my
count) and careful#ly distinguished it would appear
unseemly to overrule it three months later.

This is»

I think, the reason for Charlie Black's reticence at
oral argument.

I can think of no care which the Court has

overruled several months after seemingly reaffirming
its basic principles.

(3)

Whatever its intellectual

merit, Kirkpatrick has caused what I regard as happy
results in state and federal reapportionment. As the table
indicates,
in the appellees' brief in Gaffney (p. 26~27)J in the postKirkpatrick era relatively few states have approved
reapportionment schemes for their senates and houses
with disparities in excess of 15%.

(4)

Overruling would

occasion the reopening of an area of this Court's jurisprudence that is now on the virge of becoming solidified
and, within limits, finalized.

(5)

From a purely personal

point of view you might be especially reluctant to overrule
a case of the stature and notoriety of Kirkpatrick in the
\

same Term in which you would overrule other major recent
cases (I am thinking specifically of Kaufman and
(2)

Esta~lish

Swann~.

a de minimis rule

Without overruling Kirkpatrick entirely, the Court
might depart only from the language in that case which
declines to adopt any black-and-white percentage rule.
There is something to be said for the stability and finality that would result from any such rule.

It would

assist in getting the federal courts out of the reapportionment game.

But, there are several important considerations

.... 3 ......
on the other side.

(1)

It would require a partial

abrogation of Kirkpatrick.

(2)

There is no strong

constitutional principle upon which any such per se
rule can rest.

As you have often said, the Constitution

does not accommodate itself to per se rules.

It rests

instead on broad principles and sensible application on a
case-by-case basis.

(3)

In the absence of any solid

foundational principle, the Court would be open to a charge
of legislating.

How to we pick 4.1% rather than 5.9%?

The problem would be like that presently faced in the
Dunn v. Blumstein cases.
{3)

Distinguish Kirkpatrick.

While this case has been much cited for its rule of
exact equalityp a creful opinion may be written which
focuses on the facts of the case and upon the several
statements of controlling principle in Kirkpatrick.
Black does this well (pp 65-79).

Charlie

In essence, an opinion

would carefully parse the factual background of Missouri
reapportionment and compare it with a close look at Texas
congressional reapportionment.
that

whil~issouri's

Centrally, it would show

legislature affirmatively endeavored

to subvert the goal· of populational equality in an effort
to preserve particular seats, i.e., Missouri was not entitled
to the usual presumption of good faith.
would emphasize that there

wa~o

Secondly, the opinion

justification for the

Missouri deviations while in Texas there was an effort to
preserve county lines.
caveats.

This latter point requires two

An opinion here would heavily emphasize Mahin v.

Howell and the respect for county lines there. Andp it
would emphasize that they could not have gotten less dis-

--4--

parities without breeching more lines.
in Texas.

That is the case

The alternative plans submitted required

decimation of 18 more counties to achieve populational
equality.

Second, Kirkpatrick does suggest that preservation

of subdivision lines is not a valid justification in federal
congressional cases.

However, the Ct's opinion

i~

in

that case makes pretty clear that Missouri .did not offer
any underlying reason for the desire to preserve county
lines other than the desire to minimize political gerrymandering.

In the Texas case it may well be contended that there

are valid, neutral principles justifying preservation so
far as possible of traditional county lines.

Here the Ct

could take some of the affirmative county-line language from
Mahin and from Reynolds. I@Caveat:

This is not an entirely

satisfactory way to distinguish and is sure to ddaw a
dissent but I think it is sufficiently solid, especially
in light of the alternatives, to warrant its adoption.
Therefore, on the strength of the distinctions between
this case and Kirkpatrick the DC may be reversed and the
Plan reinstated.

(2)

Bullock v. Register, No. 72-147
There are three issues here:I wi]l address each briefly.
(1)

Jurisdiction

Because of Gunn v. Univ Comm to End the War this Ct
does not have a clear ground for jurisdiction over the
populational

dis~arity

aspect of this case, i.e. the DC

did not enter an injunction, instead it specifically declined
to enjoin the State 0 s plan.

However, the DC did enter a

-.. s-injunctive order with respect to Hallas and San Antonio.
On one of two grounds this Ct might be said to have prmper
jurisdiction over that aspect of the case.

(1)

Since the

DC had jurisdiction, and since it entered an injunction, we
need not decide whether the injunction itself was one of
statewide impact.

Any injunction entered, if the DC had

jurisdiction ab initio, is satisfactory.

(2)

The law

struck down, even though it applied only to Dallas and
Bexar Counties, was nonetheless a law of statwide impact
withdin the Court's

pr~ior

decisions.

Moody v. Flowers

involved the selection of county officials who would have
only countywide jurisdictional power.

New Left Mobilization

involved a Bd of Regenst Rule in Texas which aplplied only
on three of the 23 state college campuses in the State.
While neither of those were statewide, the present law is
because it concerns the selection of officials to state
office in the House of Representatives for the State.

They

have power to pass on statewide legislation.

--- --------

Now, if it is decided that the Ct does have J·urisdiction
over Dallas and Bexar counties, then as a matter of pendent

-

jurisdiction it might reach the populational disparity
---'

argument.

Recall in Roe v. Wade Justice Blackmun embraced

a doctrine of pendent jurisdiction on the ground that it
wo~e

wasteful of judicial

re~ources

not to hear the

m
entire case once a significant segent of it is here.

Also,

it might be argued that both issues involve the same basic
facts.

Both turn on the actions of the Redistricting Bd.

This overall theory gets this entire case before the Ct.

--6--

While I think this is an acceptable theory, it is not
unalterably correct.

Ir might be

a~rgued

on the basis

of cases like Gunn and New Left that direct appeal jurisdiction has

alwa~s

been, and should continue to be,

narrowly construed and that adoption of a doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction here is an unwarranted extension of
that jurisdictional power.
(2)

Populational disparity.

The deviation for the House is 9.9%.

You have asid

that you regard it as controlled by Mahin v. Howell, because
there 16.4 % was approved.

However, a careful reading

of Howell demonstrates that it is based on three factors:
~
~ ------------------~'

(1)

the state justified its de partures from equality

(i.e. preservation of county lines); (2)

the State

closely adhered to its rationale, cutting only a single
line in Fairfax County and that single deviation was fully
explained; (3) it was conceded that no less populational
deviation was possible in Virginia without breeching more
lines.

In theTexas case, these same factors would seem to

cut the other way.

s~io;:f

(1)

---

-------..-.

Although the State _argued for

pre~

county lines i t cut 19 of them and it did so

in a haphazard manner which it fails to explain or justify,
showing that its rationale was not pursued with great
seriousness as in Virginia.

(2)

The DC found that a

closer approximation to equality could be achieved while
cfuttiing the same number or lesser number of lines (it had
aln alternative plan before it which did a better job).
(\ / If the Ct now determines to disregard these distinguishing

\~

factors, it will be, in effect, establishing a per se rule

--6-that 16.4% (at least) is presumptively all right.

I do

not think that such a rule should be established for the
reasons stated in my prior disclussion of the congressional
case.
(3)

Multi-member districts.

There are two independent theories for

str~iking

down

the Dall and Bexar County districts, both are discussed
at length in the DC opinion.
(a)

The Texas plan constitutes discrimination in violation

of the equal protection clause between districts in the
As we say in Rodriguezp this Ct has frequently

state.

held that a state may distinguish between districts but
only where there is a rational basis for so doing (see
McGowan v. Maryland, Salsbury v. Mariland, Griffin v. School
Bd).

Is there a rational basis for discriminating between

Houston candidates and voters and those in Dallas and
•

--

San Antonio.

Houston has single-member districts while the

latter two had huge multi-member districts.
~that

The DC found

very large multi-member districts,(especially with

the other restrictions on the ballot in those areas),
disadvantage poor candidates and supporters of poor candidates.

On a theory akin to Bullock v. Carter (the DC

relied on the lower ct opinion in this case--Dies v. Carter-since Bullock had not yet been decided) it is fair to
conclude that such discrimination is "invideous."

This

theory is good because it rests on clear findings of fact
supported by the record that (1) demographically Dallas and
SA are indistinguishable from Houston; (2) that only an
independently wealthy person could win in either Dallas

--7-or San Antonio.

The State has no justification for its

discrimination. The State witnesses testified that they
to
were responding/the wishes of the local people in each
place. But the record showied and the DC found that the
Dallas people had indicated a desire for single-member districts
and that the Bd had relied on the views of a few political
cronies.

This would be a narrow way to resolve the case

without entering the Whitcomb v. Chavis thicket.
(b)

Under Whitcomb v. Chavis, Burns v. Richardson, and

Fortson, the DC also held (and seven Justices agreed last
Term when the case was here on a stay) that the m-m districts
in Dallas and SA operated to exclude black and minority
voters.

An opinion could be written focusing on the

converging operation of the place and residency requirements,
the history of minority submergence in both cities, the
operation of the DCRG and the CGG, and the effect of
a large slate which inevitably cafries every seat.

I

regard this theory as valid but am a little reserved in my
enthusiasm because it may nob be desirable for the Ct to
reopen the m-m district dispute.

Would a distinguishing

job here encourage blacks in other m-m districts to renew
their efforts despite the bar of Whitcomb.7

To a brge

extent, of course, this would depend on how carefully the
opinion was written.

However, as Justcie White said in

our ofifices last year, if this Dallas district is not
invalid no m-m district anywhere could be found to be
invalid.

(3)

Gaffney v. Cummings, 71-1476

--a ....
If you vote in Register to approve the 9.9% deviation
from equality then this case is completely controlled and
the 7.86% deviation in the House here must be approved.
However, if you adopt the approach I suggested in
Register of taking a careful look at Mahin v. Howell's
ne
articulated foundation, this case is a close o~. You
have commented on the grotesque political gerrymandered
districts in this case.

If you still think this case

a bothersome one then the following rationale would
seem appropriate.
Mahin expresses that deviations are tolerable where
the~

are justified and where the justification is adhered

to.

The State of Connecticut offers two justifications for

its 7.8% deviation.

(1)

political fairness.

Under the Mahin theory it is clear

Preservation of town lines; (2)

that the first justification falls because the State cut
41 town lines, demonstrating no clear desire to preserve
I

._

that as an overriding interest.

(2)

Political fairness,

or political gerrymandering as the appellees refer to it,

-----

raises a difficult question.
r--

>

-

This Ct has dodged in s everal

cases the question whether gerrymandering is per se unconstitutional.

My guess is that, mf pushed, the Court would

----

conclude that it is nonjusticiable and, in a sense, inevitable and dangerous in the long run.

But, it is fair

to conclude as the DC in this case did, that whatever its

-------

validity it is not a sufficient justification for deviations
---.._ from populational equality. Here the DC fould that a

closer approximation could have been easily achieved but for
this tortured desire to preserve a numerical parity of

--9--

Democratic and Repoblican seats.
There is still the question of the

~Senate

seats, where

there was also considerable political gerrymandering but
a much closer approximatifon to equality (less than 2%).

-----

I would not knock that down under the theory expressed in
.....

-

the former paragraph but it is difficult to say anything
about that aspect of the case.

The DC did not focus parti-

cular attention on it and the briefs barely mention the
Senate.

If that aspect of the case requires the Ct for the

first time to decide whether gerrymandering is unconstitutional, it is a most undesirable circumstance.

Instead

of reaching the senate question, however, I would hold that
since the State must start over with the House, and since it
has apparently tried trn

treat the House and the Senate as

a single operative unity, it would probably wish to consider
anew its senate districting to make it compatible with its
new house scheme.

Moreover, we simply to not have the sort

of focused record and argument necessary to decide the Sejnate
question.
Final caveat:

It may be appropriate on the other side

of this case to look at the number of people constituting

~

1 the populational disparity.
I

In Missouri in Kirkpatrick

I

, the 5.9% deviation comprehended about 20,000 peple, whereas
\ the 7.86 deviation inthe House and the 2.% deviation in the
Senate in Connecticut involved only 800 or so people.
might, therefore, be argued

-that where

It

the numbers make

such a great difference a greater percentage is permissible
where

til~~~

smaller units of government are involved.

LAH

REAPPORTIONMENT NOTES
·Bullock v. Register, No. 72-147
I.

f\.

State of Texas' Brief

Populo.ti•n

(1} Populational disparities of 9.9% do not have to
be justified at all. Reynolds mandates only "substantial"
equality or "approximate" equality. It requires of the
State that it act in "good faith." Swann v. Adams
recognized that de minimus .deviations are unavoidable
Kirkpatrick undermines the tolerance for de min~imus deviations but that is a Congressional ca.se. Reynolds
and Connor v. Williams recognine that a looser standard
should apply to the States. The State would argue that,
so long as the State acts in good faith, its plan will be
approved where deviations from exactitude are not
substantial.
(2} If some justification is required, Texas
has met it in its preservation of county lines. This
is a policy mandated by the State Const; it was required
by the Texas SC in Smith v. Craddick; in Kirkpatrick
the county integrity argument appeared hollow and
after-the-fact (A belated attempt to squeeze within
Reynolds}; also there the State could have come closer
w/o breeching its own justification; also lower
deviation plans were before the ~i State legislature.
The State need not persuade the DC that its policy is a
good or important one, only that it is rational and
legitimate.
(3) The mathematical exactitude standard is seriously
flawed. Note in Reynolds that the Ct said that mathematical
exactness "is hardly a workable constitutional requirement."
Census statistics often undercount minority groups;
population statistics do not accurately reflect voting
statistics; census alome does not account for shifts
in population over a decade.
(4) Waht @ practicalities of the political process?
Talks of the "political impact" of any scheme and the need
for "play in the joints." Compromise is the life blood
of the poli~ical process.

--2-c. Multi-member districts--SAN ANTONIO
Here findings are less persuasive with regard to
Whitcomb than even Dallas.

II.

Appellee (Texas Repub Party)II--Tom Gee; Terry Bray

Factual disputess Texas argued in DC that it had no obligation to explain existing disparities; refused to submit
an alternative plan; the DC found that the State had followed its own justification--county lines--only fitfully
(cuts 19 counties, but only one "small" county)
Dallas & San Antonio
There is no rational basis for discrimination against
D and SA and in favor of Houston w respect to sunglemember districts. May have been a product of time pressure;
or politics but the DC found the cities to be identical
in all important respects.
This Ct has said that single-member districts are
preferrable all other things being equal in Connor v.
Williams. The Ct has also said that either is permissible
in Whitcomb, Burns, Fortson.
These are not ordinary m-m districts. (1) They are
very large and, therefore, require expensive campaigns
to win. The proof was that it is virtually impossible
to win w/o the support of the Dallas machine. (2) Both
areas have significant minority pockets.
Relies on Bullock for the impact on the impecunious.
What justification? (1) Local citizens prefer it.
DC and record refute this claim. Does not concede that
majority preference would be an acceptable justification
(p. 30). (2) Policy of providing single-m districts
when there were 1,000,000 residents. But Dallas was
1.3 million and there is no rationale of that rule of
thumb.
A.

B.

Populational Variances
(1) Good faith explanation is lacking in view of the
manner in which the Plan was adopted. It was the product

--3--

The DC did two thingss (1) declared that the
State H of R was malapportioned, but it did not enter
an injunction, giving the State a chance to act; (2)
ordered Dallas & Bexar counties reapportioned.
Steps in the analysis. Gunn was a DC declaratory judgment
that a State law was unconstitutional but refusing
to enter an injunction until after next legislative
session. Whitcomb v. Chavis, fn 19, DC held state legis
reapportionment invalid but sitayed injunction until after
next legislature.
The Dallas SA aspect of the case will not support a
direct ap~eal. Moodly v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97--no
statewide application. Bd of Regents, and Skolnick.
III.

State's reply to Jurisdictional argument
Focuses on the appealability of the injunction w respect
to the two cities. Contends that this Ct has jurisdiction
if the case is one properly before a three-judge ct and
if an injunction or entered. It is not correct to look
only to the impact of the order. The first argument then is
that the law need not be of statewide applicability.
The State then argues that the injunction is one having
statewide impact. In Moody they were county officials,
having local authority only. Here they are state officials
havi#ng statewide power
Once it establishes that the Dallas & Bexar County
portions of the case are before us, it gets in the
state reapportionment scheme as a matter of pendent
jurisdiction. Both involve examintaion of the
proceedings of the Reditricting Bd. Relies on Roe v.
Wade. Its argument is essentially one of juaicial
economy.
(Examination of case law on jurisdictional q.)
Gunn v. University Comm to End the War, 399 U.S. 383
(1970). Antiwar demonstrators were arrested during a
LBJ speech in Texas under the Texas disturbing toe peace
statute. They filed suit in a three-j ct to enjoin the
statute. The DC held that law unconstitutional as
overbroad. After saying that they were entitled to

- .,_
This Ct held that it has no jur'is because the order
is not one granting or denying an injunction. This
is not a mere "tecnicality" said the Ct. Congress
required that the law be narrow,ty construed. And,
it is not possible to know what the Ct has decided.
Whitcomb v. Chavis. 403 U.S. 124 (1971)
Here the DC found improper districting and malapportionment
of the State legis but declined to issue an injunctive order.
Instead it withheld judgment giving the State legislature
a chance to reapportion itself. Fn 19 says that this Ct
does not have jurisdiction because no injunction was granted or denied, citing Gunn.
This case was fild by residents of Indiana challenging
multi-member districts for the state house and senate
for Marion County. The DC agreed with the suit and
decided that full state reapportionment was required,
but it said "An injunction will not is:sue at this time"
in order to give the Governor a chance to call a
special session. The Governor appealed directly to this
Court. On March 16, 1970 this Ct noted probable
jurisdiction.lj#id#i# One week later, it revoked its
prior note and noted, instead, the appeal by the Governor
from the ensuing final judgment. 397 U.S. 984. Then it
decided the appeal from the formal injunction and
dismissed the previous one. 403 U.S. 914, citing Gunn.
Bd of Regents v. New Left Education Project, 404 U.S.
The term "statute" in 2281 d<hes not include a "state statute
having only local impact, even if administered by a state
official." Holds that the Bd of Regents Rules were not of
statewide applicability. Although the brief accuses
the Ct of overruling Alabama State Teachers Ass'n, 393
U.S. 400, and the dissent in New Left (WOD) does also,
the majority distinguishes it on the ground that it w~s~
an attack upon a local impact having the effect of being
expressive of a statewi~e policy of racial discrimination.
Alabama State Teachers is a PC affirmance w/o opinion.

--5-Board of Revenue and Control, and challenged Suffolk Cty
Bd of Supervisors. These were held not to be laws of
statewide applicability, even though they were like other
local laws in the State.

Other cases reversed in light of Gunn:
(1) Fontane v. Dial,303 F. Supp. 436 (1969) (WD Texas-Thornberry, Spears, Suttle)
P is manager of movie theatre; Ds are the local ass't DA
and his assistant; they obtained a search warrant to seize
the film w/o a prior adversary hearing. The DC held that
the state law allowing seizure w/o prior adversary hearing
violated the first and 4th amendments. The DC said:
.:fi"The procedures defendants used in seizing
the motion picture film, trailers, and display posers,
as evidence dfor future criminal procedutions against
plaintiffs under article 527, are hereby declared
unconstitutional, and defendants are ~~ordered to
return the seized materials to plaintiffs. In
addition, defendants are prohibited from utilizing
the provisions of section 6 of said statute, unless
a prior adversary hearing is afforded the party
against whom 'any writs and processes • . . are
sought.
"Inasmuch as defendants have represented in open
Court that they will abide by any final decision
reached herein, it is not deemed necessary at this time
to grant injunctive relief to the plaintiff. However,
in the event this judgment is not complied with
in good faith, this Ct will entertain further request
for such relief."
399 U.S. 521 dismissed for want of jurisdiction, citing
Gunn. WOD dissented.
(2) Hutcherson v. Lehtin,313 F. Supp. 1324 (ND Cal 1970-Duniway, Sweigert, Levin)
This was a tenants' suit against landlords challenging
the constitutionality of the California unlawful de~ainer
statute on the ground that it impermi ~ bly limits the
1
defenses that may be raised, includin
hat ~ iction was
in retaliation for reporting code v~ations ~breach by
landlord of coven~nt to repair, an
onconformity of
premises to municipal code. The DC abstained as to the
first claim to allow the state cts to decide whether
that defense may be raised, and denied a consti viol on
the latter two.
This Ct, 399 U.S. 522, dismissed for want of jurisdiction,

--6-I cannot tell for sure w/o reviewing the briefsl but
this is the only logical explanation since it is clear that
the DC did deny an injunction with respect to the 2d and
3d defenses.
(3) Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F.Supp. 293 (ED Wise. 1970-Kerner, Reynolds, Gordon--PC)
P was a physician prosecuted in a state ct under a
state anti-abortion statute which made it unlawful to perform
n abortion except to save the life of the mother. On
the basis of notions of abstention and also because of
the bar of 2283 (pre-Younger) the DC refused to issue
an injunction against the pending state prosecution but
it did go on to declare the law unconstitutmonal.
This Ct, 400 U.S. 1, said "appeal dismissed," citing
Donovan and Gunn. The State, and not the Doctor,
was appealing.
(4)

[h. d.]
ISSUES in Bullock v. Register · ·
(1) Supreme Ct jurisdiction under 1253. Inclined to
agree with explanation in State's reply brief. Scope
of injunction is unimportant if case was properly befpre
the DC and, in any event, the order was one of statewide
applicability. The populational disaprity argument
could be treated as pendent under a Roe v. Wade
analysis.
(2) Populational disparities. 9.9% is not so de minimus
as to require no justification at all. Rem in Abate v.
Mundt 11.9% was allowed but this was a narrow opinion and
was supported by a strong and consistently maintained
rationale.
The State's justification is weak in view of 19
deviations. Case here is primarily a comparison to
Mahin v. Howell where, as I recall, the rational had
been closely adhered to.
(3) Multi-member districts
The first confusing question is which theory to
apply. Should this be treated as a straight Whitcomb
case in which we look for proof that m-m districts
operate to disenfranchise minorities? Or, should
the wealth discrimination argument be made. And, if
that is to be the course, what is the controlling test?
If the m-m districts in Dallas are not impermissible
then no m-m districts could ever be. The Negro in Dallas
is politically subservient .to the DCBG since that is the
only way to get elected. (Note the amicus figures indicating
the success of single-member districts.)

DC PC in Bullock v. Regester, · No. 72-147
P. 14--State made no effort to explain any deviations from
equality.
P. 18--The State itself has not complied with Smith and
has not explained the rationale that makes its desire to
preserve local boundaries so importamt.
No rational is offered for distinctions between multi-m
and single-m districts. The Bd did not consider or explain
the difference. The million-resident rationale of Kilgarlin
.
was violated here; there is nothing in the record to
support the grassroots support notion.
DC relying on cases such as the DC opinion in Bullock vT
Carter says if it disadvantages candidates because of their
wealth it must meet compelling state interest test.
P. 29--DC refrains from holding m-m districts per se invalid as discriminatoyy against the poor because the recrod
is too thin to support such action and because it may not
constitute "invideous discrimination."
The DC follows a straight Bullock argument. M-m dist
candidates and voters in some areas are disadvantaged
on the basis of wealth and the State has shown no compelling
state interest.
P. 35--Finds no rational basis for the discrimination between
candidaites and voters in Dallas and Houston.
The DC applied the test of Whitcomb separately and found
i~l#~~dthat it met the required level of proof of a
system operating to dilute the vote of racial minorities.
Makes a similar finding w respect to SA and Mexican-Americans. Focuses on the history of mistreatment and
discrimination and being blocked out of the policical
process.
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Bob Bullock et al., Appellants, On Appeal from the
United States District
v.
Court for the Western
Diana Regester et al.
District of Texas.
[May - , 1973]

MR. JusTICE W,JJITE delivered the~nion of the

Court. ~ ~ ~~·
rp~
Thi:- c~tsflons conc~1ing the validity
of the reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Representatives adopted in 1970 by the State Legislative Redistricting Board: First, whether there were unconstitutionally large variations in popula.tion among the districts
defined by the plan; second, whether the multimember
districts provided for Bexar and Dallas Counties were
properly found to have been invidiously discriminatory
against cognizable racial or ethnic groups in those
counties.
The Texas Constitution requires the state legislature
to reapportion the House and Senate at its first regular
session following the decennial census. Tex. Const.,
Art. III, § 28.1 In 1970, the legislature proceeded to
Article III, § 28, of t he Texas Constitution provide ~ :
"The Legislature shall, at its first regula r session a ft er the publication of each United States decennial census, apportion to the st at e
into senatorial and representative districts, agreeable to the provisions
of Sections 25, 26 , and 26-a of this Article. In the event the Legislature shall at any such first regular session followin g the publication
of a United States decennial census, fail t o make such apportionment,
same shall be done by the Legislature Redistricting Board of Texas,
which is hereby created, and shall be composed of fi.v<' (5) members,
1
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reapportion the House of Representatives but failed to
agree on a redistricting plan for the Senate. Litigation
was immediately commenced in state court challenging
the constitutionality of the House reapportionment.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the legislature's
plan for the House violated the Texas Constitution. 2
as follows: The Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Attorney General, the Comptroller of Public
Accounts and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, a majority of whom shall constitute a quorum. Said Board shall assemble in
the City of Austin within ninety (90) days after the final adjournment
of such regular session. The Board shall , within sixty (60) days
after assembling, apportion the state into senatorial and representative districts, or into senatorial or representative districts, as the
failure of action of such Legislature may make necessary. Such
apportionment shall be in writing and signed by three (3) or more
of the members of the Board duly acknowledged as the act and deed
of such Board, and, when so executed nnd filed with the Secretary
of State, shall have force and effect of law. Such apportionment shall
become effective at the next succeeding stntewide general election.
The Supreme Court of Texas shall have jurisdiction to compel such
Commission ot perform its duties in accordance with the provisions
of this section by writ of mandamus or other extraordinary writs
conformable to the usages of law. ThP Legislature shall provide
necessary funds for clerical and technical aid and for other expenses
incidental to the work of the Board, and the Lieutenant Governor
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be entitled to
receive per diem anJ travel expense during the Board's session in
the same manner and amount as they would receive while attending
a special session of the Legislature. This amendment shall become
effective .January 1, 1951. As amended Nov. 2, 1948."
2 The Court held that the plan violated Art. III, § 26, of the Texas
Constitution, which provides:
"The members of the House of Representatives shall be apportioned among the several counties, according to the number of population in each, as nearly as may be, on a ratio obtainrd by dividing
the population of the State, as ascertained by thr most recent Unitrd
States census, by the number of members of which the House is
composed; provided, that whenever a single county has sufficient
population to be entitled to a Represrntative, such county shal1 qe

'

.
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Smith v. Craddick, 471 S. W. 2d 375 (Tex. 19-71). Meanwhile, pursuant to the requirements of the Texas Constitution, a Legislative Redistricting Board had been
formed to begin the task of redistricting the Texas Senate.
Although the Board initially confined its work to the
:reapportionment of the Senate, it was eventually ordered,
in light of the judicial invalidation of the House plan,
to also reapportion the House. Mauzy v. Legislative
Redistricting Board, 471 S. W. 2d 570 (Tex. 1971).
On October 15, 1971, the Redistricting Board's plan for
the reapportionment of the Senate was released, and, on
October 22, 1971, the House plan was promulgated.
Only the House plan remains at issue in this case. That
plan divided the 150-member body among 79 singlemember and 11 multimember districts. Four lawsuits,
eventually consolidated, were filed challenging the
Board's Senate and House plans and asserting with respect to the House plan that it contained impermissible
deviations from population equality and that its multimember districts for Bexar County and Dallas County
operated to dilute the voting strength of racial and ethnic
minorities.
A three-judge District Court sustained the Senate
plan, but found the House plan unconstitutional.
'------~---------------Graves
v. ~
Barnes, 343 F.
Supp. 704 (WD Tex. 1972).
The House plan was held to contain constitutionally
impermissible deviations from population equality, and
the multimember districts in Bexar and Dallas Counties
formed into a separate Representative District, and when two or
more counties are required to make up the ratio of representation ,
such counties shall be contiguou to each other; and when any one
county has more than sufficient population ro be entitled to one or
more Representatives, such Representative or Representatives shall
be apportioned to such county, and for any ;;urplus of population it
may be joined in a Representative Dist rict with any othE>r contiguotv;
cotmty or countief)."
·

'

.
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were deemed constitutionally invalid. The District
Court gave the Texas Legislature until July 1, 1973, to
reapportion the House, but the District Court permitted
the Board's plan to be used for purposes of the 1972
election, except for requiring that the Dallas County
and Bexar County multimember districts be reconstituted
into single-member districts for the 1972 election.
The State appealed the statewide invalidation of the
House plan and the substitution of single-member for
multimember districts in Dallas County and Bexar
County. 3 MR. JusTICE PowELL denied a stay of the
judgment of the District Court, 405 U. S. 1201, and we
noted probable jurisdiction. 409 U. S. 840.

I
We deal at the outset with the challenge to our jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, which
permits injunctions in suits required to be heard and
determined by a three-judge district court to be appealed directly to this Court. 4 It is first suggested that
the case was not one required to be heard by a threejudge court. The contention is frivolous. A statewide
reapportionment statute was challenged and injunctions
were asked against its enforcement. The constitutional
questions raised were not insubstantial on their face, and
the complaint clearly called for the convening of a threejudge court. That the court declared the entire appor3

In a separate nppeal, we summarily affirmed that portion of the
judgment of the District Court upholding the Senate plan. Archer
v. Smith, 409 U. S. 808 (1972).
4 28 U. S. C. § 1253 provider:;:
"Except as otherwise provided by law , any party may appeal to
the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice
and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil
action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be
heard and determined by a district court of three judge~' . "

72-147-.0PIN'ION
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tionment plan invalid, but entered an injunction only
with respect to its implementation for the 1972 elections
in Dallas and Bexar Counties, in no way indicates that
the case required only a single judge. The State is therefore properly here on direct appeal with respect to the
injunction dealing with Bexar and Dallas Counties, for
the order of the court directed at those counties was
literally an order "granting . . . an . . . injunction in
any civil action ... required . . . to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges'' within the
meaning of § 1253.
We also hold that the State, because it appealed from
the entry of an injunction, is entitled to review of the
District Court's accompanying declaration that the proposed plan for the Texas House of Representatives, including those portions providing for multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties, was invalid statewide. This declaration was the predicate for the court's
order requiring Dallas and Bexar to be reapportioned into
single districts, for its order that "unless the Legislature
of the State of Texas on or before July 1, 1973, has
adopted a plan to reapportion the legislative districts
within the State in accordance with the constitutional
guidelines set out in this opinion this court will so apportion the State of Texas" ; and for ordering the Secretary
of State to "adopt and implement any and all procedures
necessary to properly effectuate the orders of this Court
in conformance with this Opinion . ... " In these circumstances, although the State could not have directly
appealed to this Court the entry of a declaratory judgment unaccompanied by any injunctive relief, Gunn v.
University Committee, 399 U. S. 383 (1970); Mitchell
v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427 ( 1970) , we conclude that we
have jurisdiction of the State's entire appeal. Roe v.
Wade,- U. S. (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers v, Jacobson, 362 U. S. 73 (1960) . With the
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Texas reapportionment plan before it, it was in the interest of judicial economy and the avoidance of piecemeal
litigation that three-judge District Court have jurisdiction
over all claims raised against the statute when a substantial constitutional claim was alleged, and an appeal to
us, once properly here, has the same reach. Roe v. Wade,
supra, at - ; Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U. S. 320
(1970); Florida Lime &: Avocado Growers v. Jacobson,
supra, at 80.
II
The reapportionment plan for the Texas House of
Representatives provides for 150 representatives to be
selected from 79 single-member and 11 multimember
districts. The ideal
district is 74,645 persons. The dis..,_______...__-----tricts range from 71 ,597 to 78,943 in population per representative, or from 5.8 1o overrepresentation to 4.1 %
underrepresentation. The total variatio.D between largest and smallest district is thus 9.9 % .5
The District Court read our pr:ro;cases to require any
deviations from equal population among districts to be
justified by "acceptable reasons" grounded in state
policy; relied on Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526
( 1969) , to conclude that the permissible tolerances suggested by Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), had
been substantially eroded; suggested that Abate v.
Mundt, 403 U. S. 182 (1971) , in accepting total deviations of 11.9 % in a county reapportionment was sui
generis; and considered the "critical issue" before it to
be whether "the State [has] justified any and all variances, however small, on a basis of a consistent, rational
State policy." 343 F. Supp., at 713. Noting the single
fact that the total deviation from the ideal between District 3 and District 85 was 9.9 %, the District Court.
5

Sec Appendix to opinion of the Court,

""' "';

'
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concluded that justification by the State was called for
and could discover no acceptable state policy to support
the deviations. The District Court was also critical of
the actions and procedures of the Legislative Reapportionment Board and doubted "that [the] board did the
~ort of deliberative job ... worthy of judicial abstinence."
Id., at 717. It also considered the combination of singlemember and multimember districts· in the House plan
was "haphazard," particularly in providing single-member
districts in Houston and multimembet districts in other
metropolitan areas, and that this "irrationality, without
reasoned justification, may be a separate ground for declaring the entire plan unconstitutional." 6 Finally, the
court specifically invalidated the use of multimember·
districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties as unconstitutionally discriminatory against a racial or ethnic group ..
The District Court's ultimate conclusion was that "the
apportionment plan for the State of Texas is unconstitutional as unjustifiably remote from the ideal of 'one man,.
one vote' and that the multi-member districting schemes
for the House of Representatives as they relate specifically·
6 It may be, although we are not sure, that the District Court
would have invalidated the plan statewide because of what it thought
was an irrational mixture of multi- and single-member districts:
Thus in questioning the use of single-member districts in Houston
but multimember districts in all other urban areas, and remarkmg
that the State had provided neither "compelling" nor " rational"
explanation for the differing treatment, the District Court merely
concluded that this cla sification "may be" an independent ground
for invalidating the plan. But there are not authorities in this
Court for the proposition that the mere mixture of multi- and singlemember districts in a single plan, even among urban areas, is invidiously discriminatory , and we construe the remark::; not as part
of the District Court's declaratory judgment invalidating the state
plan but as mere advance advice to the Texas Legislature a~ to what.
would or would not be acceptable to thr D1strict Cout.t.~
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to Dallas and to Bexar Counties are unconstitutional in
that they dilute the votes of racial minorities." I d., at
735·.7
Insofar as the District Court's judgment rested on the
conclusion that the population differential of 9.97u from
the ideal district between District 3 and District 85
made out a prima facie equal protection violation under
the Fourteenth Amendment, absent special justification,
the coJ.lr.!:. was in error. It is plain from Mahan v.
HoweU, 410 U.S. - ( 1970), and Gaffney v. Cummings,
ante, p. - , that state reapportionment statutes are not
subject to the same stnct stan ar s applica e o reapportionment o congress1ona seats.
trlcpatrick v.
Preisler d1 not
e tolerances contemplated by
ReynoLds v. Sims with respect to state districting and
we did not hold in Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440
(1967), or Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U. S. 120 (1967), nor
later in Mahan v. Howell, supm, that any deviations
from absolute equality, however small, must be justified
to the satisfaction of the judiciary to avoid invalidation
under the Equal Protection Clause. For the reasons set
out in Gaffney v. Cummings, ante, p. - , we do not
consider relatively minor population deviations among
st'iitelegiSiat!ve Clistricts to suostantially dilute the
weight of mdlviauaiVotes-in-thelargerdistr'icts so as to
deprive incrrv1au3:1Siii'these districts of fair and effective
representation. Those reasons are as applicable to Texas
as they are to Connecticut; and we cannot glean an
equal protection violation from the single fact that two
legislative districts in Texas differ from one another by
7

The District Court also concluded, contrary to the assertions of
certain plaintiffs, that the Senate districting scheme for Bexar County
did not " unconstitutionally dilute thC' votes of any political faction
or party." The majority of the District Court also concluded that
Senate districting scheme for Harris County did not dilute black.
votes,.

'

.
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as much as 9.9%, when compared to the ideal district. /
Very likely, larger differences between districts woul~,
d-"'....--_,net-be-to1entble without justification "based on legitimate
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational
state policy," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S., at 579; Mahan
v. Howell, supra, at - , but here we are confident that
appellees failed to carry their burden of proof insofar
as they sought to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause from population variations alone. The
total variation between two districts was 9.9%, but the
average deviation of all H?use districts from the ideal
was 1.82%. Only 23 districts, all single-member,
were over or underrepresented by more than 3% ,
and only three of those districts by more than 5·% .
We are unable to conclude from these deviations alone
that appellees satisfied the threshold requirement of proving a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause. Because the District Court
had a contrary view, its judgment must be reversed in
this respect. 8

III
We affirm the District Court's judgment, however,
insofar as it invalidated the multimember districts in Dal8 The Court's conclusion that the variations in this case were not
jiJstified by a rational state policy would . in any event, require reconsideration and reversal under Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. (1973). The Texas Constitution, Art. III , § 26, expresses the state
policy against cutting county lines wherever possible in forming
representative districts. The District Court recognized the. policy
but, without the benefit of Mahan v. Howell, may have thought the
variations too great to be justified by that policy. It perhaps
thought also that the policy had not been sufficient ly or consistently
followed here. But it appears to us that to stay w1thin tolerable
population limits it was nece~sary to cut some county lines and that
the State achieved a constitutionally acceptable accommodation between population principles and its policy aga mst cutting county
lines in forming representative district ~.
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las and Bexar Counties and ordered those districts to be·
redrawn into single-member districts. Plainly, under our
cases, multimember districts are not per se unconstitutional, nor are they necessarily unconstitutional when
used in combination withS!ngle-member distri~tsin other
parlSOI the State~ Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124
(1973); see
(1971) ;Ma!U:tn v. Howell, 410 U. S. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 ( 1964); Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713 ( 1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964). 9 But we have entertained
claims that multimember districts-a;; beingused!nvidiously to ~ncel out orminimiZe the voting stre11th of
- groups.------------~-v. Chavis,
- supra; Burns v.
racial
See Whitcomb
RUli:ardian, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey, supra. To sustain )\
such claims, it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated agamst as not ha legislative seats
in ~otential. Tne plaintiffs' burden is to roCluce-e'Vidence to support fii1dmgs tnat the
political processes lea mg o nommatwn and election
were not equiny opento partiCipatiOn by the group in
question-tliat Its meml5ers had less opportunity than
did other residents in the district to participate in the
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149-150.
With due regard for these standards, the District Court
first referred to the history of official racial discrimination
in Texas, which at ~toucfiea tfle right of Negroes
to register and vote and to participate in the democratic

-

9 See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U . S. 124, 141-148 (1971), and
the cases discussed in n. 22 of that opinion, including Kilgarlin v.
Hill, 386 U . S. 120 (1967), where we affirmed the District Court's
rejection of petitioners' contention that the combination of singlemember, multimember, and floterial districts in a single reapportionment plan was "an unconstitutional 'crazy quilt.'" 386 U. S.,
[\.t 121,
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proceeses. 343 F. Supp., at 725. It referred also to the
Texas rule requiring a majority vote as a prerequisite to
nomination in a primary electi®~nd to the eo-called
"place" rule limiting candidacy for legislative offiice from
a multimember district to a specified "place" on the
ticket, with the result being the election of representa..
· tives from the Dallas multimember district reduced to
a head-to-head contest for each position. These char;.
acteristics of the Texas electoral system, the District
Court thought, enhanced the opportunity for racial discrimination.10 More fundamentally, it found that since
Reconstruction days, there have been only two Negroes
in the Dallas County delegation to the Texas House of
Representatives and that these two were the only two
Negroes ever slated by the Dallas Committee for Responsible Government (DCRG ), a white-dominated organization that is in effective control of Democratic Party
candidate-slating in Dallas County. 11 That organization,
the District Court found, did not need the support of
the Negro community to win elections in the county, and
it did not therefore exhibit good-faith concern for the
political and other needs and aspirations of the Negro
community. The court found that as recently as 1970
the DCRG was relying upon "racial campaign tactics in
white precincts to defeat candidates who had the overwhelming support of the black community." !d., at
727. Based on the evidence before it, the District Court
concluded that "the black community has been effectively
excluded from participation in the Democratic primary
10
There is no requirement that candidat es reside in subdistricts
of the multimember district. Thus, all candidat Ps may be selPcted
from outside the Negro residentia I area.
11
The District Court found that "it is extremely diffi cult to secun'
either a representative seat in the Dallas Count y delega tion or the
Democratic primary nomination without t he Pndorsement of t he
Dallas Committee for Responsible Government .'' 343 F. Supp. 726 ,
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selection process," id., at 726, and was therefore generally
not permitted to enter into the political process in a
reliable and meaningful manner. These findings and
conclusions are sufficient to sustain the District Court's
judgment with respect to the Dallas multimember district and, on this record, we have no reason to disturb
them.

IV
The same is true of the order requiring disestablishment of the multimember district in Bexar County.
Consistently with Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475
(1954), the District Court considered the MexicanAmericans in Bexar County to be an identifiable class for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes and proceeded to inquire whether the impact of the multimember district
on this group constituted invidious discrimination. Surveying the historic and present condition of the Bexar
County Mexican-American community, which is concentrated for the most part on the west side of the City of
San Antonio, the court observed, based upon prior cases
and the record before it, that the Bexar community, along
with other Mexican-Americans in Texas, t z had long "suffered from, and continues to suffer from, the results and
effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in the
fields of education, employment, economics, health, politics, and others.'' 343 F. Supp., at 728. The bulk of
the Mexican-American community in Bexar County occupied the Barrio, an area consisting of about 28 contiguous census tract in the City of San Antonio. Over
78% of Barrio residents were Mexican-Americans, making
up 29% of the county's total population. The Barrio
is an area of poor housing; its residents have low income,
poor education, and a high rate of unemployment. The
12

Mexican-Americans constituted approximately 20 % of the populittion of the State of Texas.
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typical Mexican-American suffers a cultural and language
barrier u that makes his participation in community proc~
esses extremely difficult, particularly, the court thought,
with respect to the political life of Bexar County. "A
cultural incompatibility ... fostered by a deficient educational system . . . conjoined with the poll tax and
the most restrictive voter registration procedures in the
nation have operated to effectively deny MexicanAmerican access to the political processes in Texas even
longer than the Blacks were formally denied access by
the white primary." 343 F. Supp., at 731. The residual
impact of this history reflected itself in the fact that
Mexican-American voting registration remained very
poor in the county and that, although they now occupy
a plurality in Bexar County, only five MexicanAmericans since 1880 have served in the Texas Legislature
from that county. Of these, only two were from the
Barrio area.H The District Court also concluded from
the evidence that the Bexar County legislative delegation
in the House was insufficiently responsive to MexicanAmerican interests.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the District Court evolved its ultimate assessment of the multimember district, overlaid, as it was, on the cultural and
economic realities of the Mexican-American community
in Bexar County and its relationship with the rest of the
county. Its judgment was that Bexar County MexicanAmericans "are effectively removed from the political
processes of Bexar [County] in violation of all of the
18

The District Court found that '' [t]he fact that [MexicanAmericans] are rea red in a subculture in which a dialect of Spanish
is the primary language provides permanent impediments to their
educational and vocational advancement :wd creates other traumatic
problems." 343 F . Supp., at 730.
H Two other residents of the Barrio, a Negro and an Anglo~
American, have also served in the Texa ~ Legislature.
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Whitcomb standards, whatever their absolute numbers
may total in that County." !d., at 733. Single-member
districts were thought required to remedy "the effects
of past and present discriminations against MexicanAmericans," id., and to bring the community into the
full stream of political life of the county and State by
~ncouraging their further registration, voting, and other
political activities.
The District Court ap rently paid due heed to Whitcomb v. Cham's, supra, did not hold that every racial or
political group has a const1ttitioi1al right to be represented
in the state legislature, but dH:1, Irom !ts · own special
vantage point, conCTude thatthe mU'i:tllne~er CITStrict,
as~d and opera eel m BexarCounty, invidiously
excluaealvrexican-A~e;re;:;s fr~ective participation
in political life, specifically !n the election of representatives to the Texas House of Representatives. On the
record before us, we are not inclined to overturn these
findings, representing as they do a blend of history and
an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of
the Bexar County multimember district in the light of
past and present reality, political and otherwise.
Affirme.d in part, reversed in part.

~<JJ_()"-'
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APPENDIX TO OPINION OF WHITE, J.
The Redistricting Board's plan embodied the following districts:
Percent
Deviation
Average
Over
(Under)
Multi(Under)
Over
Member
Population
District
1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
4l

(3)

(2)

(18)

(9)
(2)
(4)

76,285
77,102
78,943
71 ,928
75,014
76,051
221,314
74,303
76 ,8Ul
72,410
73 ,136
74,704
75,929
76,597
76,701
74,218
72,941
77,159
150,209
75,592
74,65 1
73 ,311
75 ,777
73 ,966
75 ,633
1,327,321
77 ,788
72,367
76,505
77,008
75,025
675,499
73,071
76,071
147,553
74,633
295,516
78,897
77,363
71,597
7:3,678

73,771

75,104

73,740

75,055
73,777
73,879

1,640
2,457
4,298
(2,717)
369
1,406
( 874)
( 342)
2,168
(2,235)
(1,509)
59
1,284
1,952
2,056
( 427l
(1 ,704
2,514
459
947
6
(1,334)
1,132
( 679)
988
( 905)
3,143
(2,278)
1,860
2,363
380
410
(l ,574)
1,426
( 868)
( 12)
( 766)
4,252
2,718
(3,048)
( 967)

2.2
3.3
5.8
(3.6)
.5
+.9

(l.Zl

( .5
2.9
(3.0)
(2 .0)
.1
1.7
2.6
2.8
( .6)
(2.3)
3.4
.6

1.3
.0
(1.8)
1.5
( .9)
1.3
(1.2)
4.2
(3.1)
2.5
3.2
.5
.5
(2.1)
1.9
(1.2)
( .0)
(1.0)
5.7
:i.6
(4.1)
(1.3)

Continued
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APPENDIX-Continued

District
42
43
44
45
46 (11)
47
48 (3)
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59 (2)
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72 (4)
73
74
75 (2)
76

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

8i5

Population

Average
MultiMember

14,706
74,160
75,278
78,090
826,698
76,319
220,056
76,254
74,268
75,800
76,601
74,499
77,505
76,947
74,070
77,211
75,120
144,995
75,054
73,356
72,240
75,191
74,546
75,720
72 ,310
75,034
74,524
74,765
77,827
73,711
297,770
74,309
73 ,743
147,722
76,083
77,704
71,900
75,164
75,111
75,674
76,006
75,752
75,634
71,564

75,154
73,352

72 ,497

74,442
73 ,861

(Under)
Over
61
( 485)
633
3,445
509
1,674
(1,293)
1,609
( 377)
1,155
1,956
( 146)
2,860
2,302
( 575)
2,566
475
(2,148)
409
(1,289)
(2 ,405)
546
( 99)
1,075
(2 ,335)
389
( 121)
120
3,182
( 934)
( 203)
( 336)
( 902)
( 784)
1,438
3,059
(2 ,745)
519
466
1,029
1,361
1,107
989
(3 ,081)

Percent
Deviation
Over
(Under)

.1
( .6)
.8
4.6
.7
2.2
(1.7)
2.2
( .5)
1.5
2.6
( .2)
3.8
3.1

( .S)
3.4

.6
(2.9)
.5
(1.7)
(3.2)
.7
( .1)

1.4
(3.1)
.5
( .2 )
.2
4.3
(1.3)
( .3)
( .5)
(1.2)
(1.1)
1.9
4.1
(3.7)

.7
.6
1.4
1.8
1.5
1.3
( 4.1)

Continued
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District
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Population
73,157
73,045
75,076
74,206
74,377
73,381
71,908
72 ,761
73,328
73,825
72,505
74,202
72,380
74,123
75 ,682
75,204

Average
MultiMember

(Under)
Over
(1 ,488)
(1 ,600)
431
( 439)
( 268)
(1 ,264)
(2,737)
(1,884)
(1 ,317)
( 820)
(2,140)
( 443)
(2 ,265)
( 522)
1,037
559

Percent
Deviation
Over
(Under)
(2.0)
(2.1)
.6
( .6)
( .4)
(1.7)
(3.7)
(2.5)
(1.8)
( 1.1)
(2.9)
( .6)
(3.0)
( .7)

1.4

.7
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 26, 1973

Re: No. 72-147, Bullock v. Regester
Dear Byron,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A ·. BLACKMUN

April 30, 1973

Re:

No. 72-147 -

Bullock v. Regester

Dear Byron:
Please join me. At conference I indicated concern
about Bexar County, for I felt that the appellees had not sustained thei r burden, particularly in light of the fact that
Mexican-Americans now enjoy a county plurality. Your treatment of this, however, is an effective one when it emphasizes
the "intensely local appraisal, " and I am content to go along
with you on your evaluation judgment.
Sincerely,

~
Mr. Justice White

Copies to the Conference

-

~
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· I wonder if you would consider making changes to accommodate
the following suggestions : 'ilill'·
~1:.

· · -~ 1. On p. 12 of your opinion, Barrio (in San ':Antonio ) is described
as an area of "poor education". And on p. 13 there is a r eference t o
the Mexican-Americans being "effectively denied access t o the political
proeesses"'due in part to the "deficient educational system" •
.. -

<~~l

..tih

;j

This may be read as being c ontrary, at least implicitly, to the
Court's opinion in Rodriguez. There (pp. 32, 33), we said that the
educational system provided children with the opportunity to acquire th•
basic minimal skills necessary to participate in the political process.
In Rodri ~e zJ of cours"e, we were speaking explicitly about present levels
of educational expenditure, and we had previously emphasized the progress. "' "'.
made in recent year
I take it that in Regester you were talking about
the history of disadvan aged educational backgrounds. The persons
currentlydisadvantaged may '\\!:~.11 have found the 'sch.ools which they
attended s ome years ago to be 'far less adequate than thos e now available.
The progress in Texas has been most marked in the ~ad~. Moreover, I suppose a significant number of the persons
were born
and educated in Mexico or even in rural migratory labor camps in s outh
Texas.
;f·

!<>
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t
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In view of this apparent incompatibility in the two opinions as to
educaticm in the same area of San Antonio, would you be willing to make
the necessary modest revisions to emphasize that you are talking about
the district court's finding of a history of disadvantaged treatment which

- 2-

is unrelated to the education presently received by young residents. I
note that on page 13 you refer to ''the residual impact of this history".
2. The first sentence at the top of page 11 might be read, I think,
as implying that requirement of a majority vote is in itself a potentially
discriminatory election provision. I would suppose that, in most
situations, the majority vote requirement is wholesome. This is
especially true where there are a number of candidates for an office,
none of whom obtains more than a fractional plurality. Perhaps you
could drop a footnote along the lines of the enclosed draft.
As these are minor suggestions, I am not sending a copy of this
letter to the Conference.

Sincerely,

To: The Chi.Gf J usti ce

Mr .

Dou&la::>
Br·ei.man
E.·. 3 c.~-i ;_--..:. c ~ 8 Lei;,n· t
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LJ:. t.fL.J~J t- CG ;_; ~acl:mun
J.u. ~;l.~tlce J.)u"v~Gll/
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
No. 72-147

From: White , J.

STAJi~1a ted :
Recirculated:

Bob Bullock et al., Appellants,) On ~ ppeal fron~ t~e
Umted States D1stnct
v.
Court for the Western
Diana Regester et al.
District of Texas.
[May -, 1973]

MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case raises two questions concerning the validity
of the reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Representatives adopted in 1970 by the State Legislative Redistricting Board: First, whether there were unconstitutionally large variations in population among the districts
defined by the plan; second, whether the multimember
districts provided for Bexar and Dallas Counties were
properly found to have been invidiously discriminatory
against cognizable racial or ethnic groups in those
counties.
The Texas Constitution requires the state legislature
to reapportion the House and Senate at its first regular
session following the decennial census. Tex. Const.,
Art. III, § 28.' In 1970, the legislature proceeded to
Article III, § 28, of the Texas Constitution provides:
"The Legislaturr shall, tit its fir~t regular session after the publication of each United State~ decennial census, apportion to the state
into senatorial and representative districts, agreenble to the provisions
of Sections 25. 26. and 26-n of this Article. In the event the Legislature shall at an~· such fir~t regular se~sion following the publication
of a. United Statrs decennial censu~ , fail to make such apportionment,
snme shall be done b~- the Legislature Redistricting Board of Texas,
which is hereby cre:lted, and shall be composed of five (5) members,
1
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reapportion the House of RepreEentatives but failed to
agree on a redistricting plan for the Senate. Litigatioll
was immediately commenced ill state court challenging
the constitutionality of the House reapportionment
The Texas Supreme Court held that the legislature's
plan for the House violated the Texas Constitutio11."
as follow~;: The Lieutenant Governor, the Speakrr of the Housr of
Representatives, the Attorney General, the Comptroller of Public
Account::; and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, a maJority of whom shall constitute a quorum. Said Board shall assemble in
the City of Austin within ninety (90) days after thr final adjournme11t
of :ouch regular session. The Board shall, within si:-..iy (60) day~
after assembling, apportion the state into senatonal and reprrsentative districts, or into ::;enatorial or representative distncts, as thP
failure of action of such Legislature may make nccc~sar~·. Such
apportionment ~;hall be in writing and signed by three (3) or morf'
of the member~ of the Board duly acknowledged as the act and deed
of such Board, and, when so rxecuted and filed with the Secretary
of State, shall have force and effect of law. Such apportionment shall
become effective at the next succeeding ::;tatew1de general electJOIJ.
The Supreme Court of Texas shall have jurisdiction to comprl such
Commission ot perform it~; duties in accordancr w1th the proviswno;
of this section by writ of mandamus or other extraordinary wnts
conformable to the usages of law. The Legislature shall provide
necessary funds for clrrical and technical aid and for other expenses
incidental to the work of the Board, and the Lieutenant Governor
and the Speaker of the House of Repre~:;entatives shall be entitled to
receive per diem and travel exprnse dnrmg the Board's session in
the same manner and amount as thry would receivr while attrndmg
a special session of thr Legislature. This amrndment shall brcome
effective January 1, 1951. A~ amrnclrd Nov. '2, 1948."
2
The Court held that the plan violated Art. III, § 26, of the Texas
Constitution, which provides:
''The member::; of the Housr of Representative~; shalt br apportioned among the several counties, according to the number of population in each, as nearly as may be, on a ratio obtamed by div1ding
the population of the State, as ascertainrd by the most recent United
States census, by the number of members of which thP Hou~e i::;
composed; provided, that whenever a single county ha:s sufficient
populat10n to br PntJtled to '' Representative, such county shall be
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Smith v. Craddick, 471 S. W. 2d 375 (Tex. 19-71). Meanwhile. pursuant to the requirements of the Texas Constitution, a Legislative Redistricting Board had been
formed to begin the task of redistricting the Texas Senate.
Although the Board initially confined its work to the
reapportionment of the Senate, it was eventually ordered,
in light of the judicial invalidation of the House plan,
to also reapportion the House. Mauzy v. Legislative
Redistricting Board, 471 S. W. 2d 570 (Tex. 1971).
On October 15, 1971, the Redistricting Board's plan for
the reapportionment of the Senate was released, and, on
October 22, 1971, the House plan was promulgated.
Only the House plan remains at issue in this case. That
plan divided the 150-member body among 79 singlemember and 11 multimember districts. Four lawsuits,
eventually consolidated. were filed challenging the
Board's Senate and House plans and asserting with re•
spect to the House plan that it contained impermissiblf'
deviations from population equality and that its multimember districts for Bexar County and Dallas County
operated to dilute the voting strength of racial and ethnic
minorities.
A three-judge District Court sustained the Senate
plan, but found the House plan unconstitutional.
Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (WD Tex. 1972).
The House plan was held to contain constitutionally
impermissible deviations from population equality, and
the multimember districts in Bexar and Dallas Counties
formed into a ~eparate Representative District, and when two 01
more countie::; are reqUTred to make up the ratw of repre::;entat ion,
such counties shall be contiguous to rach other; and when any on<·
county has more than ::;ufficient population to be enti1lrd to one· or
more Repre::;cntat1ves, ::;uch Represrntative or Repre~;entatives :;hall
be apportioned to such county. and for any ~urplus of population it
may be joined in a Represrntativr DiHtrict with any other contiguous
county or counties. "
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were deemed constitutionally invalid. The District
Court gave the Texas Legislature until July 1, 1973, to
reapportion the House, but the District Court permitted
the Board's plan to be used for purposes of the 1972
election, except for requiring that the Dallas County
and Bexar County multimember districts be reconstituted
into single-member districts for the 1972 election.
The State appealed the statewide invalidation of the
House plan and the substitution of single-member for
multimember districts in Dallas County and Bexar
County.H MR. JusTICE PowELL denied a stay of the
judgment of the District Court, 405 U. S. 1201, and we
noted probable jurisdiction. 409 V. S. 840.

I
We deal at the outset with the challenge to our jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U. S. C. ~ 1253, which
permits injunctions in suits required to be heard and
determined by a three-judge district court to be appealed directly to this Court. 4 It is first suggested that
the case was not one required to be heard by a threejudge court. The contention is frivolous. A statewide
reapportionment statute was challenged and injunctions
were asked against its enforcement. The constitutional
questions raised were not insubstantial on their face , and
the complaint clearly called for the convening of a threejudge court. That the court declared the entire apporIn a separate appeal, we summarily affirmrd that portion of the
JUdgment of the District Court upholding; the Senate plan . Archer
v. Smith, 409 U. S. 808 (1972) .
1
28 U. S. C. § 1253 provides :
''Except a~ othrrw1se providrd by law, any party may appeal to
the Supreme Court from un order granting or denying, after notic0
and hraring, an interlocutor~· or permanent injunction in any civ1!
action, ::mit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be
heard and determmed by a district court of thrre judgeo;.''
3

'

.
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tionment plan invalid, but entered an injunction only
with respect to its implementation for the 1972 elections
in Dallas and Bexar Counties, in no way indicates that
the case required only a single judge. The State is therefore properly here on direct appeal with respect to the
injunction dealing with Bexar and Dallas Counties, for
the order of the court directed at those counties was
literally an order "granting . . . an ... injunction in
any civil action . . . required ... to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges" within the
meaning of § 1253.
We also hold that the State, because it appealed from
the entry of an injunction, is entitled to review of the
District Court's accompanying declaration that the proposed plan for the Texas House of Representatives, mcluding those portions providing for multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties, was invalid statewide. This declaration was the predicate for the court's
order requiring Dallas and Bexar to be reapportioned into
single districts, for its order that ''unless the Legislature
of the State of Texas on or before July 1, 1973, has
adopted a plan to reapportion the legislative districts
within the State in accordance with the constitutional
guidelines set out in this opinion this court will so apportion the State of Texas"; and for ordering the Secretary
of State to "adopt aud implement any and all procedures
necessary to properly effectuate the orders of this Court
in conformance with this Opinion ... . " In these circumstances, although the State could not have directly
appealed to this Court the entry of a declaratory Judgment unaccompanied by any injunctive relief, Gunn v.
University Committee, 399 U. S. 383 ( 1970); Mitchell
v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427 (1970). we conclude that we
have jurisdiction of the State's entire appeal. Roe v.
Wade, U. S. (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers v, Jacobson, 362 U. H. 73 ( 1960) . With thP

~·

.
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Texas reapportionment plan before it, it was in the inter~
est of judicial economy and the avoidance of piecemeal
litigatio·n that the three-judge District Court have jurisdiction over all claims raised against the statute when a
substantial constitu tiona] claim was alleged , and an appeal to us, once properly here, has the same reach . Roe
v. Wade, supra , a t - ; Carter v. Jury Cornrn'n, 396 U.S.
320 (1970); Florida Lirne & Avocado Growers v. Jacobson , supra, at 80.

II
The reapportionment plan for the Texas House of
Representatives provides for 150 representatives to be
selected from 79 single-member and 11 multimember
districts. The ideal district is 74,645 persons. The districts range from 71,597 to 78,943 in population per representative, or from 5.8 % overrepresentation to 4.1 %
underrepresentation. The total variation between largest and smallest district is thus 9.9 % ."
The District Court read our prior cases to require any
deviations from equal population among districts to be
justified by "acceptable reasons" grounded 111 state
policy; relied on Kirk patrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526
(1969), to conclude that the permissible tolerances suggested by R eynoLds v. Sirns , 377 U. S. 533 ( 1964), had
been substantially eroded; suggested that Abate v.
Mundt, 403 U. S. 182 (1971), in accepting total deviations of 11.9 % in a county reapportionment was sui
generis; and considered the "critical issue " before it to
be whether "the State [has] justified any and all variances, however small, on a basis of a consistent, rational
State policy." 343 F. Supp., at 713. Noting the single
fact that the total deviation from the ideal between District 3 and District 85 was 9.9 % , the District Court.
5

See Appendix to opinion of the Court ,
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concluded that justification by the State was called for
and could discover no acceptable state policy to support
the deviations. The District Court was also critical of
the actions and procedures of the Legislative Reapportionment Board and doubted "that [ theJ board did th(i
sort of deliberative job ... worthy of judicial abstinence.''
Id., at 717. It also considered the combination of singlemember and multimember districts in the House plan
"haphazard," particularly in providing single-member
districts in Houston and multimember districts in other
metropolitan areas. and that this "irrationality, without
reasoned justification, may be a separate ground for deFinally, the
claring the entire plan unconstitutional."
court specifically invalidated the use of multimember
districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties as unconstitutionally discri~inatory against a racial or ethnic g'Toup,
The District Court's ultimate conclusion was that "the
apportionment plan for the State of Texas is unconstitutional as unjustifiably remote from the ideal of 'one man,
one vote' and that the multi-member districting schemes
for the House of Representatives as they relate specifically
I;

6
1! may be, although we arr not ::;uri?, that tlw D1stnct Court
would have invalidated thP p!Hn ;;tat~:>widP becau::;e of what it thought
was a11 irrational mixturp of mnlti- and single-member di;;trict~ .
Thu~ in questioning the u~e of ::;ingle-membrr district~ 111 Hou;;ton
but multimember di::;trict;; in all other urban area::;, and remnrkmg
that the Statp had prov1ded nPither "compelling" nor "rational''
explanation for the differing trratmrnt. the Di::;trict Court merely
concluded that this tla:::sJfication ··may be" an mdeprndPnt ground
for mvalidnting the plan. But therE' are not authorities in th1s
Court for the proposition that thr merE' m1xturp of mult1- nnd ::;mglemember di::;trict::; in a single plan, even among urban area::;, i::: mvidiously discriminatory, and wr con::;trur the remark;; not a~ part
of the Di:stnct Court'~ dPclnrator~· judgment mvalidatiug the ::;tatP
plan but as mere advancE' advicr to tlw TPxas LegislaturE' ws to what
would or would not be acceptable to thr District Coi'Lrt ..

'

.
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to Dallas and to Bexar Counties are unconstitutiOnal in
that they dilute the votes of racial minorities." ld., at
735.7
Insofar as the District Court's judgment rested 011 the
conclusion that the population differential of 9.9o/(; from
the ideal district between District 3 and District 85
made out a prima facie equal protection violation under
the• Fourteenth Amendment, absent special justification,
the court was in error. It is plain from Mahan. v.
Howell, 410 U.S.- (1970), and Gaffney v. Cummings,
ante, p. - , that state reapportionment statutes are not
subject to the same strict standards applicable to reapportionment of congressional seats. Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler did not dilute the tolerances contemplated by
Reynolds v. Sims with respect to state districting. and
we did not hold in Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440
(1967), or Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U. S. 120 (1967), nor
later in Mahan v. Howell, supra, that any deviations
from absolute equality, however small, must be Justified
to the satisfaction of the judiciary to avoid invalidation
under the Equal Protection Clause. For the reasons set
out in Gaffney v. Cummings, ante, p. - . we do not
consider relatively minor population deviations among
state legislative districts to substantially dilute the
weight of individual votes in the larger districts so as to
deprive individuals in these districts of fair and effective
representation. Those reasons are as applicable to Texas
as they are to Connecticut; and we cannot glean an
equal protection violation from the single fact that two
legislative districts in Texas differ from one another by
7
The Di~trict Court al~o concluded, contrary to the a;:;;:;crtions of
certain plaint iff·, that the Senate di:>trict ing ;:;cheme for Bexar County
did not ''uncon~titutionally dilute the votes of any political faction
or party.'' The majonty of the District Court also concluded thnt
Senate districting ~cheme for Hnrns County did not dilute black
voteb.
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as much as 9.9% , when compared to the ideal district.
Very likely, larger differences between districts would
not be tolerable without justification "based on legitimate
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational
state policy," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S., at 579; Mahan
v. Howell, supra, at - , but here we are confident that
appellees failed to carry their burden of proof insofar
as they sought to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause from population variations alone. The
total variation between two districts was 9.9% . but the
average deviation of all House districts from the ideal
was 1.82 7{ . Only 23 districts. all single-member,
were over or underrepresented by more than 3%.
and only three of those districts by more than 5o/<.
We are unable to conclude from these deviations aloue
that appellees satisfied the threshold requirement of proving a prima faci e case of invidious discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause. Because the District Court
had a contrary vle\o\', its judgment must be reversed 111
this respect.o

III
We affirm the District Court's judgment, however ,
insofar as it invalidated th e multimember districts in DalThe Comt '~ c on c lu ~ ion tha t the variation::; in thi;; case wer e not
by a rationa l st ate poli r ~· would, in any r vent , rPquirP reconsideration and rev e r~al uud er Mahan \'. Howell, 410 U. S. (1973) . The T rxa ~ C on ~ titution , Art . Ill. § 26, <·xpresse" tlw sta t e
policy agmn::; t cutting count~· hoes wherPvf r po s~ ibl e in forming
repre~ entative distri ct::;. The District Court recognized th P polie~ ·
bur. without the benefit of Mahan\' . Elotcell. m ay havP thought thr
va riations too great to be justified by that pulley. It p crhap~
thought al::;o that th e policy had not been suJli cit>nt I~· or c on s i ~ tenll)·
followed here. But it appea r;: to us that to ,; t a~ · within tolerable
population limits it was necei:isa ry to cut some co unt~ · lines and tha t
tlw Sta t e achieved a con:::tirutiona lly acceptable accommodat ion between populati on prin c ipl e~ and it ~ policy a gain ~ t euttmg count y
lines 111 forming representative dist ricth.
8
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las and Bexar Counties and ordered those districts to be
redrawn into single-member districts. Plainly, under our
cases, multimember districts are not per se unconstitutional, nor are they necessarily unconstitutional when
used in combination with single-member districts in other
parts of the State. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124
(1971); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. ( 1973); ser
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 (1964); Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964)." But we have entertained
claims that multimember districts are being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of
racial groups. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra; Burns v.
Richardson, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey , supra. To sustain
such claims, it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats
in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the
political processes leading to nomination and election
were not equally open to participation by the group iu
question-that its members had less opportunity than
did other residents in the district to participate in the
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149-150.
With due regard for these standards, the District Court
first referred to the history of official racial discrimination
in Texas. which at times touched the right of Negroes
to register and vote and to participate in the democratic
See Whitcomb v. Chav1s, 40a 0. S. 1:24, 141-14g (1971), and
the case:-; discus:::ed in n. :22 of tlwt opinion. including Kilga1'1t11 "·
Hill, :38() U. S. 120 ( 1967), where w<> affirmed the District Coul't ·~
rejection of petitioner;;' contention that the combination of singlemember, multimember. and floterial district s in a :::ingle reapportionment plan was "an unconstitutional 'crazy quilt.' " 386 U. S..
at 121..
'

1
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proceEses. 343 F. Supp., at 725. It referred also to the
Texas rule requiring a majority vote as a prerequisite to
nomination in a primary election and to the Eo-called
"place" rule limiting candidacy for legislative offiice from
a multimember district to a specified "place" on the
ticket, with the result being the election of representatives from the Dallas multimember district reduced to
a head-to-head contest for each position. These char- \
acteristics of the Texas electoral system, neither in
themselves improper or invidious, enhanced the opportunity for racial discrimination, the District Court
thought. 11 ' More fundamentally, it found that since
Reconstruction days, there have been only two Negroes
in the Dallas County delegation to the Texas House of
Representatives and that these two were the only two
Negroes ever slated by the Dallas Committee for Responsible Government (DCRG), a white-dominated organization that is in effective control of Democratic Party
candidate-slating in Dallas County. 11 That organization.
the District Court found, did not need the support of
the Negro community to win elections in the county, and
it did not therefore exhibit good-faith concern for the
political and other needs and aspirations of the Negro
community. The court found that as recently as 1970
the DCRG was relying upon "racial campaign tactics in
white precincts to defeat candidates who had the overwhelming support of the black community." Jd., at
727. Based on the evidence before it, the District Court
concluded that "the black community has been effectively
Tht'rt' is no requirement that randidatP~ rt'~idt' in o;ubdistricts
of the multimember district. Thus, all raudidatt's may bt' ~elt'cted
from outside the Negro re ·idential area .
11
The District Court found that ·'it is extremely difficult to secure
either a reprrsentntive ;;eat in the Dalla;: County delegation or thr
Democratic primary nomination without the pndorsement of thr
Dallns Committe<> for Respom;ihlP Government ,'' :~43 F . Supp. 726 .
10
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excluded from participation in the Democratic primary
selection process," id., at 726, and was therefore generally
not permitted to enter into the political process in a
reliable and meaningful manner. These findings and
conclusions are sufficient to sustain the District Court's
judgment with respect to the Dallas multimember district and, on this record, we have no reason to disturb
them.

IV
The same is true of the order requiring disestablishment of the multimember district in Bexar County.
Consistently with Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475
(1954), the District Court considered the MexicanAmericans in Bexar County to be an identifiable class for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes and proceeded to inquire whether the impact of the multimember district
on this group constituted invidious discrimination. Surv~ying the historic and present condition of the Bexar
County Mexican-American community, which is concentrated for the most part on the west side of the C'ity of
~an Antonio. the court observed. based upon prior cases
and the record before it, that the Bexar community, along
with other Mexican-Americans in Texas,'" had long "suffered from, and continues to suffer from, the results and
effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in the
fields of education, employment, economics, health. politics, and others.'' 343 F. Supp., at 728. The bulk of
the Mexican-American community in Bexar County occupied the Barrio, an area consisting of about 28 contiguous census tract in the City of San Antonio. Over
78% of Barrio residents were Mexican-Americans, making
up 29o/r of the county's total population. The Barrio /
is an area of poor housing; its residents have low income
12
Mexican-Amrricans con~tituted approximatrly 20% of the pol?ula_tion o~ thr St<_!te of Trxa~.

:
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and a high rate of unemployment. The typical Mexican-

~

American suffers a cultural and language barrier ''~ that
makes his participation in community processes extremely difficult, particularly, the court thought, with
respect to the political life of Bexar County. "A cul- ,
tural incompatability ... conjoined with the poll tax and
the most restrictive voter registration procedures in thEJ
nation have operated to effectively deny MexicanAmerican access to the political processes in Texas even
longer than the Blacks were formally denied access by
the white primary." 343 F. Supp., at 731. The residual
impact of this history reflected itself in the fact that
Mexican-American voting registration remained very
l)OOr in the county and that, although they now occupy
a plurality in Bexar County, only five Mexican~
Americans since 1880 have served in the Texas Legislature
from that county. Of these, only two were from the
Barrio area.H The District Court also concluded from
the evidence that the Bexar County legislative delegation
in the House was insufficiently responsive to MexicanAmerican interests.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the District Court evolved its ultimate assessment of the multimember district, overlaid, as it was, on the cultural and
economic realities of the Mexican-American community
in Bexar County and its relationship with the rest of the
county. Its judgment was that Bexar County MexicanAmericans "are effectively removed from the political
processes of Bexar [County] in violation of all of thf'
13 The District Court found that "[t]he fact that [MexicanAmericans] are rt>ared m a ;;ubculture in which a dialect of Spanish
is the primary languagt> provides pt>rmanent impediment;; to their
educational and vocational advancement and creates other traumatic
problems." 343 F. Supp., at 730.
14
Two other residents of the Barrio, a Negro and an AngloAmencan, have also ;;ervrd in the Texa;; LegislaturP.

:
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Whitcomb standards, whatever their absolute numbers
may total in that County." U., at 733. Single-member
districts were thought required to remedy "the effects
of past and present discriminations against MexicanAmericans," id., and to bring the community into the
full stream of political life of the county and State by
encouraging their further registration, voting, and other
political activities.
The District Court apparently paid due heed to Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, did not hold that every racial or
political group has a constitutional right to be represented
in the state legislature, but did, from its own special
vantage point, conclude that the multimember district,
as designed and operated in Bexar County, invidiously
excluded Mexican-Americans from effective participation
in political life, specifically in the election of representatives to the Texas House of Representatives. On the
record before us, we are not inclined to overturu these
findings, representing as they do a ble11d of history and
an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of
the Bexar County multimember district in the light of
past and present reality, political and otherwise.
Affirmed i:n part, reversed in part,

,.t
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APPENDIX 1:0 OPINION OF

WHITE, J.

The Redistricting Board's plah embodied the following di::;trirts :
Percent
DPviation
Average
(Under)
Ov('r
Multi(Under)
Over
Member
Population
bistl'ict
2.2
1,H40
76 ,285
1
3.3
2,457
77.102
2
5.8
4.29
78,948
8
(2,717)
71,928
(8 .~)
4
:~69
.5
75,014
5
1,406
1.9
76,051
6
(1.2)
( 874)
221,:314
73,771
7 (3)
( .5)
( 342)
74,803
8
76.,818
2,168
2.9
9
(2,285)
10
72,410
(3.0~
(2.0
(1,509)
11
73.13fi
12
74,704
.l
59
1,284
75 ,929
1.7
13
2.6
1,952
14
76,597
2,05(1
2.8
15
76,701
( .6)
( 427)
16
74,218
72,941
(1,704)
(2.3)
17
:~.418
77,159
2,514
19 (2)
150,209
459
.H
75,104
20
75,592
947
1.3
.0
21
74,651
6
22
(l.k)
73,311
(1,3:~4)
23
75 ,777
1,132
1.5
24
( 679)
( .9)
73,960
25
75,633
988
1.3
26 (18)
(1.2)
1,327 ,321
( 905)
73,740
27
77,788
4.2
3.143
28
72.367
(2,278)
(3.1)
29
76,505
1.860
2.5
30
77,008
2,36a
3.2
31
75,025
380
.5
32 (9)
675,499
75,055
410
.5
(1 ,574)
(2.1)
33
73,071
34
711.071
1.426
1.9
35 (2)
(1.2)
147,55:3
73.777
( 868)
36
74,633
( 12)
( .0)
37 (4)
295,516
( 7!16)
(1.0)
73,879
38
78,897
4 ,252
5.7
a9
77.363
2,718
3.6
40
71,597
(:3,04R)
(4.1)
73,678
( 967)
(1.3)
4l
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APPENDIX-Continued

District
42
43
44
45
46 (11)
47
48 (3)
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59 (2)
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

72 (4)
73
74
7f> (2)
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Population
74,706
74.160
75 ,278
7K,OYO
S2G ,G98
76,:319
220,056
7fi,254
74 ,26S
75 ,800
76,601
74 ,499
77 ,505
76,947
74,070
77,211
75 ,120
144.995
75,054
73,356

Average
Multi"
Member

(')i

{ 485)

.1

( .6 J

.s

();~;~

75 ,154
n ,a52

72 ,497

7~ ,240

75,191
74.546
75,720
72.310
75,034
74,524
74,765
77,827
73 ,711
297 ,770
74,309
73 ,743
147 ,722
76 ,083
77,704
71,900
75 ,164
75 ,lll
75 ,674
76,006
75,752
75 ,6:34
71 ,564

( Umler)
Ovrr

Percent
De,·iatiori
Ovrr
(UJldcr)

:l,-+45
509
l ,G74
(1,29:3)
1,609
( :377)
1,155
1.956
( 146)
2,860
2,ao2
( 575)
2,566
475
(2,148)
409
(1 ,289)
(2,405)
54(i

99)
1,075
(2 ,:335)
:389
( 121)
120
(

:~ . 1 82

( 934)

4.fi
.7
2.2
(1.7)
2.2
( .5)
1.5
2.6
( .2)
a.s
3.1
( .il)

3.4
.6
(2 .9)
.5
( 1.7)
(3 .2)
.7
( .1)

1.4
(3.1)
.5
( .2)
.2
4.3

(U)
.:~)

74.442

( 203)

(

( .5)
(1.2)

7;3 ,861

( 836)
( 902)
( 784)

1,438
:3.059
(2 ,745)
519
4li6
1.029
1,361
] ,107
9H9
(:3 ,081)

(1.1)

1.9
4.1
(3 .7)
.7
.li

1.4
1.8

1.5

u

( 4.1)

Continued
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APPENDIX-Continued

Di~trirt

Population

H6
87
8R
89

7:3,157
7:3,045
75 .07()
74.20()

90
91

74 ,:~i7
73,:3~1

92

71,901'

93

72 ,761

Avt>rage
MultiM<'mber

(Under)
Ovrr
(1,4R8)
(1 ,600)

431
( -la9)
( :268)
(1 ,2!34)
(2,7:37)
(l,kR4)

P<'rernt
Deviation
Ovrr
(Under)
(2.0)

(2.l)
,f\
( .6)

( .4)

(1 .7)
(:3 .7)
(2 .5)
(l.S)

94

7:3,:321'

o .:n7)

95
97

74 ,202

( R20)
(2,140)
( -l-l3)

(1.1)

9H

7:3.825
72.505

91'
99
100
101

i2 .3SO
74,12:{

(2,:2f\5)
( 52:2}

(3.0)

75 ,(i82

1,037

( .7)
1.4

75 ,204

.'i59

.7

(2.9)

( Ji)

~rtntt

Clfttmt llf tftt 'JtnU

~ulthtghtn. ~.
CH ... MBERS 01'"

,,,. t

<!f. 2U~~c1
June 13, 1973

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

Re: No. 72-147- White v. Regester

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Regards,

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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